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A Corpsman's Prayer 
 
Grant me, oh Lord, for the coming events; 
Enough knowledge to cope and some plain common sense. 
Be at our side on those nightly patrols; 
And be merciful judging our vulnerable souls. 
Make my hands steady and as sure as a rock; 
when the others go down with a wound or in shock. 
Let me be close, when they bleed in the mud; 
With a tourniquet handy to save precious blood. 
Here in the jungle, the enemy near; 
 
Even the corpsman can't offer much lightness and cheer. 
Just help me, oh Lord, to save lives when I can; 
Because even out there is merit in man. 
If It's Your will, make casualties light; 
And don't let any die in the murderous night. 
These are my friends I'm trying to save; 
They are frightened at times, but You know they are brave. 
Let me not fail when they need so much; 
But to help me serve with a compassionate touch. 
Lord, I'm no hero -- my job is to heal; 
And I want You to know Just how helpless I feel. 
Bring us back safely to camp with dawn; 
For too many of us are already gone. 
Lord bless my friends If that's part of your plan; 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Operational planning and policy for Navy medicine has evolved over the past 
century from a predominantly large-scale, land-based, fixed facility platform into a more 
robust, compact, mobile, and forward deployed continuum of care capable of projecting 
casualty care directly within the combat zone as well as evacuating the injured 
expeditiously rearward when more definitive care is warranted.  This dynamic evolution 
in structure and mission of medical platforms has created greater needs for effective 
policy and planning tools that integrate resource requirements, project expected patient 
casualty demands upon the medical system, and validate appropriate staffing and 
structure to provide and sustain the highest levels of medical care from time of injury 
until receipt of definitive care. 
In this thesis we develop a new model called Medical Evacuation and Treatment 
Capabilities Optimization Model (METCOM) that’s designed as a user friendly 
optimization model that augments current simulations and assists in optimizing 
efficiencies, allowing for redistribution, restructuring, or realignment of medical 
resources and materials to better meet requirements elsewhere.  The model builds upon 
this revolution of change in military medical care by addressing variations in capabilities 
and policies of the medical evacuation and treatment system (METS) in order to discern 
effects on desired medical outcomes. 
To achieve this end-state, a combination of multiperiod descriptive and 
prescriptive models were utilized in order to provide medical planners and decision 
makers with the flexibility to employ a broad range of scenarios that could be analyzed 
for results against key measures of effectiveness (MOEs).  In fact, these operational 
scenarios as represented through the utilization of different casualty inflow distributions 
were shown to elicit unique and measurable outcomes for each of the overflow queues 
generated within the METCOM network.  While no specific policy stood out above the 
rest for every scenario, there were distinct advantages and disadvantages in utilizing 
some policies as they related to specific casualties as prioritized by a medical and 
evacuation priority indices.   
 xxii
Additionally, METCOM addresses the cost associated with delivery of care and 
evacuation, allowing again for decision makers to meet all requirements at the minimal 
cost.  Through the use of the cost optimization model within METCOM it was displayed 
that costs could be reduced from the default METS setup thru the optimization 
(reduction) in necessity for unused medical and evacuation capacities.  This resulted in a 
METS structure that operated with the lowest resource utilization costs while within all 
MOE constraints. 
Taken together, the descriptive and optimization data that METCOM provides 
can be utilized by planners and decision makers to employ appropriate policies, insert 
necessary medical and evacuation capabilities within the theater of operations, and 

























I. INTRODUCTION  
“The great thing in all military service is health” 
- Admiral the Lord Nelson1 
 
A. BACKGROUND  
Operational planning and policy for Navy medicine has evolved over the past 
century from a predominantly large-scale, land-based, fixed facility platform into a more 
robust, compact, mobile, and forward deployed continuum of care capable of projecting 
casualty care directly within the combat zone as well as evacuating the injured 
expeditiously rearward when more definitive care is warranted.  This dynamic evolution 
in structure and mission of medical platforms has created greater needs for effective 
policy and planning tools that integrate resource requirements, project expected patient 
casualty demands upon the medical system, and validate appropriate staffing and 
structure to provide and sustain the highest levels of medical care from time of injury 
until receipt of definitive care. 
In this thesis we develop a new model called Medical Evacuation and Treatment 
Capabilities Optimization Model (METCOM) that’s designed as a user friendly 
optimization model that augments current simulations and assists in optimizing 
efficiencies, allowing for redistribution, restructuring, or realignment of medical 
resources and materials to better meet requirements elsewhere.  The model builds upon 
this revolution of change in military medical care by addressing variations in capabilities 
and policies of the medical evacuation and treatment system (METS) in order to discern 
effects on desired medical outcomes.  To achieve this end-state, a combination of 
descriptive and prescriptive models were utilized in order to provide medical planners 
and decision makers with the flexibility to employ a broad range of scenarios that could 
be analyzed for results against key measures of effectiveness (MOEs). 
First we address the complexities that specific medical and evacuation policies 
have upon key metrics by employing a descriptive multi-period network representing the 
                                                 
1 Letter to Dr. Mosely 1803.  Cited by R. D. Heinl Jr. in A Dictionary of Military and Naval 
Quotations.  Naval Institute Press, 1966. 
2 
structural architecture of the METS.  Casualty flow was modeled throughout the network 
whereby different policies could be comparatively measured for effectiveness over any 
given combat scenario.  This component of the model allows for decision makers to 
understand the bottom-line effectiveness of specific treatment and evacuation policies 
given their determined capacities and medical requirements. 
The second component of the model addresses the optimal usage of constrained 
resources by minimizing the cost associated with the medical and evacuation capacity 
requirements of the METS while maintaining pre-defined metrics such as waiting (queue 
time) for delivery of care or evacuation that denotes the desired level of care being 
delivered.  Here a decision maker can choose the medical risk they wish to associate with 
a given operation by setting maximum limits to specific metrics and allowing the model 
to define the optimal treatment and evacuation capacities necessary to obtain that 
specified level of care. 
Taken together the components form a formidable model that identifies best 
operational policy and capacity within the METS for any given combat scenario.  This 
can also greatly assist decision makers’ operational and tactical decisions as it identifies 
bounds upon capabilities, thereby allowing for selection of a feasible solution from 
within the acceptable risk tolerance.  Medical capacity and policy decisions also affect 
the processing of overall strategic planning due to their inherent interdependence with the 
capabilities of other warfighting objectives.  Therefore, the ability to enumerate both the 
optimal and a “feasible set” of operational capabilities maximizes the flexibility of 
decision makers.   
As previously stated, trends in warfighting doctrine have continued along the lines 
of emphasizing lighter, faster, forward extended operations requiring a parallel in 
transformation for medical services.  This is epitomized in the Navy Medicine motto 
change from Charlie-Golf-One, which means “standing by ready to assist” to Charlie-
Papa, “steaming to assist” (Cowan, 2003).  These changes have led to the development of 
numerous new medical initiatives such as the Forward Resuscitative Surgery System 
(FRSS), Expeditionary Medical Unit (EMU), and the Shock Trauma Platoon (STP) that 
due to their innate structures of small scale, flexible assets, mobility, and swift response 
3 
capabilities are able to provide significant surgical stabilization efforts far forward in the 
area of operations (AO).  However, as Tropeano (2003) states, “Introducing this new 
capability into the Marine Corps continuum of care has raised many questions as to its 
impact on medical treatment and resources.”  Thus, while individual medical platforms 
present specific capabilities, it is the integration of these assets into the functioning 
medical network within the theater of operations that must be accurately staffed, 
supported, and networked to ensure that the highest levels of continuum of care and 
optimal usage of resources are realized.  Only then can valid and reliable assessment of 
the treatment and evacuation capacities ensure that casualties are expeditiously handled 
while loss of life and limb is minimized through the optimal use of these constrained 
resources. 
Recent conflicts have provided an abundance of lessons learned and supported the 
necessity of changes within the organization and delivery of casualty care.  As noted by 
Sundstrom, Blood, & Matheny (1996), “While casualties were relatively few in the Gulf 
Conflict [1991], and the wounded personnel did receive needed treatment in a timely 
fashion, future operations may yield larger numbers of casualties with greater potential 
for overwhelming the casualty evacuation system.”  Numerous studies (DoD, 1993; 
Endoso, 1994; Liston, 1998; Smith, 1995) indicated that had the medical system during 
Desert Shield/Desert Storm been taxed at its actual potential levels, serious shortages 
would have incurred with both evacuation and logistics assets, causing a detrimental 
blow to the levels of care provided.  Particularly with the potential threat of chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) weapons to cause mass 
casualties, the ability for the efficient medical treatment and evacuation of a broad 
spectrum of casualties intra and inter-theater is paramount in preserving the required level 
of care conditionally accepted by the combatant commander.   
Even without CBRNE concerns, patient flows traditionally ebb and tide with the 
intensity of conflict that commonly creates a non-uniform arrival rate of casualties.  
During the 1991 Gulf War within the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO), sixty-five 
percent of USMC admissions received at regional Level II facilities (e.g., STP or FRSS) 
occurred during the first week of major combat operations alone (Leedham and Blood, 
1992).  Additionally, during the KTO, treatment facilities were at greater distances from 
4 
the direct combat zone than warranted in current conflicts (Sundstrom, Blood, Matheny, 
1996).  Thus, as medical units move further forward in the theater of operations they can 
expect swifter arrival rates of casualties being routed to them with minimal delays due to 
their locality in the battlespace.  Given a scenario with multiple casualties, a rapid arrival 
time cycle has the potential to overwhelm a MTF if it is not operating in an efficient 
manner or staffed with appropriate resources.  Additionally, inappropriate structure of the 
medical system or inefficient delivery of treatment and evacuation can swiftly compound 
into unacceptable conditions.  For example, during combat operations in the Gulf War of 
1991, about 60 percent of patients ended up in the wrong destinations and half in the 
wrong country (Endoso, 1994).  A GAO review (1996), also found that medical units 
were not staffed and equipped to provide noncombatant care and “Were unable to support 
evacuation of casualties from the combat theater or receive large numbers of chemically 
contaminated patients.”  Thus reiterating, while individual medical platform capabilities 
are essential, it is the optimal structure (staff, capabilities, capacities, etc.) and utilization 
combined with efficient integration of these assets that make a medical evacuation and 
treatment system capable of overcoming complications caused by the “fog of war”.   
It is paramount to have planning tools that appropriately identify and model the 
required demands and potential deficiencies within the health service support system.  
Early attempts at such included the medical simulation models Optimal Placement of 
Casualty Evacuation Assets (OPTEVAC), Medical Planning and Execution System 
(MEPES), and similar yet smaller linear program models that were developed in an 
attempt to forecast patient casualty flow requirements for supporting medical logistics 
(Levy, May and Grogan 1996a, 1996b; Matheny et al., 1998; Sundstrom, Blood and 
Matheny, 1996)  The most viable of these simulation models were the External Logistics 
Processor-Medical Module (LPX-MED) and Medical Planning Module (MPM), with the 
latter being the only DoD approved tool for medical planning and programming.  Both 
were developed as first steps toward joint medical operations planning and were 
influential precursors to current medical simulation models (Levy, May, Grogan, 1996).  
Presently the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) J4 staff utilizes the Medical Analysis Tool 
(MAT), which synthesizes the previous MPM algorithms into the role of a Requirements 
Estimator (RE) and LPX-MED into a Course of Action Analysis (COAA).  This is 
5 
augmented by the use of the Tactical Medical Logistics Planning Tool (TML+) 
developed by the Naval Health and Research Center (NHRC) for better analysis and 
accommodation of certain medical logistic materials.  TML+ is a high-resolution model 
that is inclusive of all medical echelons of care, but maintains primary focus on the 
immediate treatment capabilities (Level I & II).  TML+ also incorporates the Estimating 
Supplies Program (ESP), allowing the model to more effectively addresses required 
medical logistics to support different scenarios and the Authorized Medical Allowance 
List (AMAL) which consists of items of packaged medical supply blocks prepared for 
prescribed medical missions.  MAT, which models at lower resolution than TML+ 
includes higher levels of care, but primarily focuses on intra-theatre evacuations with 
admissions being first recognized in the medical system upon reporting to Level II 
facilities.  Both models are inherently dependent upon the Navy Line community for all 
inputs that ultimately create the expected casualty rates and medical logistic 
requirements. 
The innate weakness of these simulations is that while they produce requirements 
and identify whether assets accommodate projected patient flows, they do not fully 
optimize the use of the medical logistics structure.  Current medical simulations are 
limited to single scenario application each time they are run, which limits the ability to 
apply them to the dynamic and multidimensional environments experienced in real-world 
military operations.  In effect, the simulations analyze single decision points within a 
controlled environment in which structural and operational variables are statically set in 
advance.  Therefore, simulations are good at identifying “what if” values for pre-selected 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) within single performance runs that present clear and 
concise reports, but lack the ability to produce a “big picture” of multiple dynamic 
decision points.  Additionally, simulations introduce a certain level of prohibitive 
functionality as they may be denied exploring other areas of the decision space due to 
time, costs, and intensive requirements for data required by multiple simulation scenario 
runs.  Most importantly, while simulation modeling is adequate to identify requirements 
and deficiencies to meet requirements they do not appropriately address inefficiencies 
caused by potential underutilization of the medical system. 
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B. HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT (HSS) SYSTEM 
In order to begin modeling the METS, a strong foundational knowledge of the 
current structure, modus operandi, and objectives of the HSS is necessary.  The HSS 
system is a process that delivers on demand to the warfighter a healthy, fit, and medically 
ready force; counters the health threat to the deployed force; and provides critical care 
and management for combat casualties (MCWP 4-11.1, 1998).  It is an instrumental 
portion of the operational success to any mission and is commonly influenced by a 
plethora of factors as exhibited in Figure 1.1.  It is unique in that it functions in a 
supportive role to the traditional logistics processes, and yet it is vital enough to be a 
decisive factor on the battle field.  With appropriate medical treatment and evacuation of 
sick and wounded, the HSS system effectively allows the combatant commander 
(COCOM) to sustain the level of operations required for the duration of the conflict.  
Injuries to the warfighters represent the potential for reduced operational capability due to 
both the loss of physical manpower but also due to the psychological toll the sick and 
injured represent to their own units.  As Kress (2000) states, “Because of the moral 
commitment to preserve human life, and the considerable attention that modern armies 
devote to preserve the welfare of their warfighters, medical treatment and evacuation is 
considered a major OpLog mission despite its small operational impact on the current 
campaign, and its relatively small scale.”  In the past, the infrastructure of the HSS has 
been large, cumbersome, and logistically intensive medical facilities far removed from 
the area of operations (AO). 
However, as described previously, the HSS system has been revamped towards 
the objectives of the National Military Strategy which emphasizes the use of forward 
presence, power projection, and decreased footprint in theater.  According to GAO 
reports (1996), “The Joint Staff recommended that the services investigate the possibility 
of evacuating casualties more quickly to the United States for treatment.”  This in fact 
was evidenced in action during the OIF/OEF conflict in which average time to transport 
casualties from the combat zone to the U.S. shrank from 8 days at the beginning of the 
conflict to less than 4 days by the end of 2004 (Gawande, 2004).  The HSS now provides 
a more modular, smaller, far-forward surgical presence that allows for increased surgical 
capability as well as rapid evacuation (MCWP 4-11.1, 1998).   
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Figure 1.1 Medical Logistic Influencers (From JP 4-02.1, 1997) 
 
The primary mission of the HSS is to preserve the life and limb of the warfighters.  
To meet this objective, the METS is focused on meeting the “Golden Hour” rule which 
dictates that if medical treatment can be provided within the first hour from point of 
injury (POI) the likelihood of saving life and limb is significantly increased (Wick et. al, 
1998).  Traditionally large immobile medical units far away from the combat area work 
against this time constraint of the “Golden Hour” and thus the services have shifted 
towards developing lighter and more mobile medical units that can reach casualties 
quicker or be more forward deployed in the battlespace.  However, in developing more 
mobile units a trade-off occurs as overall capacity to treat casualties decreases and 
evacuation assets are reduced or incur additional limitations.  This in effect is a tradeoff 
between the on-sight medical treatment capabilities and the evacuation efficiencies.   
The tenet of the HSS system is the triad goal of providing the Right service, in the 
Right place, at the Right time (NTTP 4-02.2).  A system is considered successful based 
upon its responsiveness, efficiency, and ability to save lives while returning maximum 
number of personnel back to duty.  This objective is most readily met by executing a 
METS policy that aligns best with the strategic and operational plans for conflict.  The 
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past HSS concept of providing definitive care in theater to maximize returned to duty 
(RTD) status has evolved to a concept that provides essential care in theater to either 
RTD within the theater patient movement policy or stabilize for patient movement to the 
next level of care, with enhanced en route medical care and definitive care (JP 4-02, 
2001).  However, the treatment and evacuation portions of the HSS system are at times 
diametrically opposed to the traditional logistics flow in the following major areas: 
• Unlike the forward flow of supplies, patients are “going against the grain” as 
they are pushed rearward out of the combat zone.  This can significantly 
impact areas of security, materiel and personnel availability, and operational 
ability.  That is to say, every vehicle or air asset utilized to conduct medical 
evacuations is not available to provide further forward support in the form of 
weaponry, logistic re-supply, or even personnel re-supply. 
• Rather than dealing with supplies measured in thousands of tons or cubic feet 
of materiel, the METS normally deals with (in relative terms) much smaller 
volumes and capacities. 
• The METS is much more complex to plan for as arrivals of casualties may not 
always conform to a standard distribution.  Utilization of the METS must be 
as consistent with minimal flow of patients as it must be in dealing with a 
mass casualty incident. 
• Unlike most logistic support setups, it is common that no dedicated evacuation 
assets are assigned to most MTFs.  Thus the system must many times operate 
on the contingency of availability of either a designated asset or lift of 
opportunity. 
• Baseline, METS is dealing with people, not parts.  Thus, a human factor 
enters the mix, causing both physical constraints on the logistic flow and 
operation of the METS network, but also adds an ethical, emotional, and 
psychological facet to the execution of the network. 
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• Delays or redirection of casualties may be prohibited as they must be 
delivered to the MTF with capabilities to treat their condition and too much 
delay can cause unacceptable degradation of the casualty’s condition. 
1. HSS Principles 
The HSS system operates on the same principles of general logistics; 
responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, economy, attainability, sustainability, and 
survivability.  Unlike the general logistics function, the HSS has an added principle that 
must also ensure a continuity of care exists for all patients (NTTP 4-02.2, 2001).  As 
Kress (2000) states, “Medical support during a campaign is a unique logistics function 
with respect to its effect on combat activities, its scale and its characteristics.”  Leaving a 
pallet of equipment unattended may be an acceptable practice for materiel purposes, but 
the same cannot be said for a human casualty who must always be attended and 
monitored. 
These principles are guides for planning, organizing, managing, and executing 
service support function of the operational plan(s).  They are situation dependent and 
seldom will all principles exert equal influence.  However, identifying which ones have 
priority is essential to establishing an effective HSS.  Service doctrine (JP 4-02, 2001; 
MCWP 4-11.1, 1998; NWP 4-02, 1995), define the principles and their relationships as 
exhibited below and in Figure 1.2. 
Responsiveness: Responsiveness is the core metric amongst the current joint staff 
planners.  It emphasizes that the medical plan must weigh the benefits of providing 
support as close to combat operations as possible with the limitations of care that can be 
provided in this environment.  All else is irrelevant if the logistics and casualty support 
system cannot provide support, conform to, and complement the commander’s concept of 
operations (NWP 4-02, 1995).  The application of this principle has been the utilization 
of the tiered structure of MTFs into levels of care (LOCs) that focus on an objective of 
providing care within the “Golden Hour”.  Throughout history, this practice has 
contributed to the reduction in morbidity and mortality by placing HSS closer to where an 
injury or illness occurs (NWP 4-02, 1995). 
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Flexibility: Similar to the old cliché “The only thing constant is change”, the HSS 
must be structured and functionally capable of extensive adaptation to changes in mission 
or operations.  Emphasis is placed on retaining the capability to meet the demands of a 
spectrum of health services plans and operations while maintaining the same level of 
care.  Flexibility in HSS planning operations complements the principles of 
responsiveness and economy. 
Continuity: Once a casualty has entered the HSS system it is paramount that the 
METS provide optimum, uninterrupted care and treatment to the wounded, injured, and 
sick.  This is a complex and sometimes difficult necessity as it requires vast integration of 
the medical treatment module and the evacuation module so as a casualty’s treatment 
never exacerbates or falls below the level of treatment already started.  Once care is 
initiated, it is continued whether the patient is in an MTF or in the casualty evacuation 
chain. The continuum of care provides the structure to achieve continuity and attain the 
principles of flexibility, economy, and sustainability (NWP 4-02, 1995). 
 
Figure 1.2 Principles of the Health Service Support system 
 
Economy: Economy is driven by the existence of finite resources and requires the 
provision of support with the lowest possible investment of resources necessary to 
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accomplish the assigned mission.  Thus, a balance within an economy of scales must be 
met as the size and structure of the HSS system will significantly impact the logistic, 
combat, and resource costs associated with providing a specific level of care.  Economy 
in HSS has traditionally been accomplished by consolidating resources and facilities at 
the earliest practicable time.  Although this practice produces economies in manpower 
and materiel, flexibility is frequently sacrificed.  Economy through consolidation must 
balance with the need for diversified treatment as a defensive measure to ensure 
survivability (NWP 4-02, 1995). 
Attainability: The ability to provide the minimum essential supplies and services 
required to begin combat operations.  Initial battle casualties may require rapid 
movement through several levels of medical care to reach the level of treatment required.  
It is paramount that policies and HSS structure are developed around realistic and fully 
executable operational plans. 
Sustainability: Sustainability is the ability to maintain a specified level of care 
throughout the operation.  The principle of sustainability focuses attention on the long-
term objectives and requirements of the supported force or unit.  Sustainability in health 
service is attained by providing as complete an array of HSS within the operations area 
and within the theater, as necessary (NWP 4-02, 1995).  Sustainability requires some 
degree of redundancy which may reduce attempts to practice economy.  Sustainability 
demands austerity and conservation to preclude supply waste and shortages, and requires 
control measures and flexibility. 
Simplicity: The avoidance of complex requirements, organizational structure, and 
operational procedures removes restrictions upon the other HSS principles.  It fosters 
efficiency in both the planning and execution of HSS operations. 
Survivability: Survivability is the capability to continue treatment and evacuation 
within the full spectrum of combat operations even when facing potential detrimental or 
destructive forces. 
The COCOM and Joint Force Surgeon (JFS) may choose to improve certain areas 
dependent upon the present or projected combat operations.  However, the dependency of 
these principles on one another emphasizes the reality that improving one principle may 
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lessen the capability of another principle.  For example, a major transformation in the 
HHS system has been to increase responsiveness and flexibility through the use of 
lighter, modular, and forward deployed medical assets.  However, these concepts entail a 
decentralization of operations and thus have potential to compromise the principles of 
economy, simplicity, and sustainability. 
2. Levels of Care 
In accordance with the Joint Health Service Support Strategy of Vision 2010 
(Force Health Protection, 2003), Levels of Care supersedes the previous terminology of 
Echelons of Care.  As JP 4-02 (2001) details, the medical structure of the Level of Care 
(LOC) concept consists of “A five-tier phased system of progressively increasing 
capabilities that begins at the point of injury (POI) and projects rearward to definitive 
care delivered in the continental United States (CONUS).”  The five LOCs are 
augmented by the patient movement system as depicted in Figure 1.3.  Each succeeding 
LOC possesses the same treatment capabilities as those forward of it and adds a new 
increment of treatment capability distinguishing it from the previous level.  Each level is 
designed to provide the mobility and capability required to meet the basic healthcare 
needs of the supported units, yet provide progressive and phased treatment, 
hospitalization, and evacuation of the sick and injured (NTTP 4-02.2, 2001). 
Level of Care I (LI):  Care is rendered at the unit and includes self aid and buddy 
aid care, examination, and emergency lifesaving measures such as maintenance of 
airway, control of bleeding, prevention and control of shock, and prevention of further 
injury. This level may include an aid station that has a physician, physician assistant, 
and/or medical officer (MO).  The elements of medical care and management available at 
this LOC prepare patients for return to duty (RTD) or evacuation to a higher LOC for 




Figure 1.3 Levels of Care (After JP 4-02.2, 1995) 
 
Level of Care II (LII):  As a minimum, LII care includes basic resuscitation and 
stabilization and may include limited surgical capability, basic blood and blood products, 
basic laboratory, pharmacy, and temporary holding facilities (JP 4-02.2, 1996).  In 
addition to the general medical staff (e.g. nurses, corpsmen, etc), the facilities are also 
manned by general surgeons and anesthesiologists and/or nurse anesthetists.  Other 
specialties may also be represented.  Ancillary support that is provided, particularly 
laboratory and radiology, is minimal.  In the fleet, this level of care is available on the 
larger ships.  For example, surgical capability will be provided by an aircraft carrier in a 
carrier battle group and by the CRTS (designated ship for treatment and transfer of 
patients) of an amphibious battle group.  In the Fleet Marine Force (FMF), the medical 
battalion consists of three Surgical Companies and eight Shock Trauma Platoons (STPs) 
that provide LII care, which includes surgical capability, basic laboratory, pharmacy, 
radiology, and holding ward facilities.  The objective of this phase of treatment is to 
perform those emergency surgical procedures which constitute resuscitation and, without 
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which, death or serious loss of limb and/or body function is likely to occur (NWP 4-02, 
1995). Surface or air evacuation to a Level III medical treatment facility (MTF) would be 
utilized for patients who require more comprehensive treatment. 
Level of Care III (LIII):  Care administered at LIII requires clinical capabilities 
normally found in an MTF staffed, equipped, and located in a lower level threat 
environment.  LIII care may be the first step toward restoration of functional health, as 
compared to procedures that stabilize a condition or prolong life.  The HSS provided by 
these facilities, the Hospital Ship (T-AH) and Combat Zone (CBTZ) fleet hospital, will 
have greater capabilities, particularly in laboratory and radiology support.  LIII care may 
not have the crisis aspects of initial resuscitative care.  Therefore, care at this level of 
treatment can proceed with greater deliberation.  Limited specialty surgical capability is 
available at LIII MTFs.  This level of care constitutes the definitive treatment that is 
needed to return many patients to full duty (JP 4-02, 2001; NWP 4-02, 1995). 
Level of Care IV (LIV):  Care is provided within  a fixed immobile MTF staffed 
and equipped for definitive care and includes specialized surgical capability (JP 4-02, 
2001).  In addition to the surgical capability provided in the lower LOC, LIV provides 
further definitive therapy for patients in the recovery phase who can return to duty within 
the time period of the theater evacuation policy.  Definitive care is normally provided by 
a Communications Zone (COMMZ) fleet hospital or an OCONUS MTF.  This level of 
care is adapted to the precise condition of the patient, and is normally provided by a fully 
staffed hospital that delivers the care necessary to complete the patient’s recovery (NWP 
4-02, 1995). 
Level of Care V (LV):  Care is convalescent, restorative, and rehabilitative and is 
normally provided by CONUS-based military, Department of Veterans Affairs, and/or 
National Disaster Medical System civilian hospitals (JP 4-02, 2001). 
The structural makeup of the five LOCs creates a phased system of treatment and 
evacuation that is commonly termed continuum of care and can be maintained from POI 
to definitive care without exacerbating a patient’s medical condition.  A casualty will 
progressively flow to higher echelons until a facility can provide the required definitive 
care and allow return to duty, or evacuation to an MTF in CONUS.  The continuum of 
15 
care as exhibited in Figure 1.4 is designed around the LOCs that manifest as highly 
mobile elements in the forward areas to more highly sophisticated and capable, but less 
mobile, elements in the rear.  This balance represents a decision point for medical 
planners as choices must be made to what the appropriate METS structure is and to what 
extent limited resources should be apportioned to the LOCs.  However, the mainstay 
objective always remains on “Returning as many personnel as possible to active duty and 
treating and stabilizing those who will not return to duty (NWP 4-02, 1995).” 
 
Figure 1.4 Continuum of Care 
 
C. TRIAGE 
Doctrine indicates that triage is “The process of utilizing limited assets and time 
to provide the greatest benefit to the largest number of patients (NTTP 4-02.2, 2001; 
NWP 4-02, 1995).”  Triage is a dynamic and continuous process of sorting and allocating 
treatment assets to patients according to pre-designated, categorical levels representing 
the type and acuity of injury.  Weighted into this triage categorization are the opinions of 
medical personnel concerning a patient’s chances of stabilization and recovery, as well as 
resource requirements to save life and limb.  Each categorization is done independent of 
other patients and operates in a memoryless system.  In otherwords, the categorization of 
an incoming patient has no dependence upon any previous arrivals (George, 2005).  
Triage is conducted as soon as a patient enters the medical system and is modified 
throughout the time periods and thru each level of care.  This is paramount as the 
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differentiation of critical from non-critical treatment needs assists in identifying where 
limited medical resources need to be applied.  Additionally, the systematic evolution of 
triage effectively determines what medical treatment can be delayed, what is needed 
immediately, and which patients may be kept in a medical queue or be most assisted by 
medical evacuations. 
As stated, the assignment of a triage category is dependent upon multiple 
variables and is a continuous process.  An assessment of clinical needs, operational 
environment, and treatment availability remain the primary variables utilized in 
evaluating a patient’s triage category.  As patients arrive at each MTF, they are assigned 
a triage category and monitored for any significant change in condition that will 
automatically dictate a re-evaluation.  The first four triage categories exhibited in Table 
1.1 and more fully described in Appendix B have been universally adopted for use by 
both U.S. and NATO forces and are clearly defined in International Standardization 
Agreements (STANAG 2879, 1986).  The fifth category of “Deceased” is commonly 
added for tracking purposes by United States and some allied forces. 
 
TRIAGE CASUALTY CATEGORIES 
Group Type Description 
C1 Immediate 
Treatment 
The immediate treatment group includes patients requiring 
emergency life-saving surgery.  
C2 Delayed 
Treatment 
The delayed treatment group includes patients badly in need of time-
consuming major surgery, but whose general condition permits 
delay in surgical treatment without unduly endangering life.  
C3 Minimal 
Treatment 
The minimal treatment group includes patients with relatively minor 
injuries who can effectively care for themselves or receive care from 
untrained personnel.  
C4 Expectant The expectant treatment group comprises patients having serious 
and often multiple injuries, requiring time consuming and 
complicated treatment with a low chance of survival.  
C5 Deceased This group is comprised of the killed in action (KIA) and died of 
wounds received in action (DWRIA).  
Table 1.1 Triage Categories (From NTTP 4-02.2, 2001; NWP 4-02, 1995). 
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D. PATIENT MOVEMENT SYSTEM 
The patient movement system consists of three components: patient evacuation, 
medical regulating, and en route care.  While the patient movement system is a major 
focus of this research, it is noteworthy that it does not operate independently of the other 
components necessary for a well complemented patient movement system.  Each of these 
components are outlined further in this chapter, but as a functional unit they maintain an 
overarching objective to move patients from the point of injury (POI) as efficiently as 
possible, while maintaining the level of care of each patient and not exacerbating their 
medical condition.  Levels of patient care allow health care providers to make decisions 
relating to a patient’s disposition, timely treatment, and subsequent hospitalization based 
on the availability of transportation to move the patient to more definitive care.  Patient 
movement therefore contributes to minimizing the effects of wounds, injuries, and 
disease by making planned patient movement and the five levels of care that comprise the 
HSS system available to the patient (JP 4-02.2, 1996). 
The guiding principle in patient movement is that patients will be moved only as 
far rearward as the tactical situation dictates or as clinical needs change (NTTP 4-02.2, 
2001).  During intensive conflict phases or within areas coming under enemy fire, 
medical evacuation may be imprudent or even impossible until the environment allows 
safer mobility.  Additionally, if a unit is in the midst of a maneuver or conflict, there may 
be little or no resources available to immediately evacuate a casualty out of the area.  The 
effective movement of patients to additional levels of care is driven by medical necessity 
of wounds and availability of medical resources while efficient utilization of the patient 
movement system minimizes both morbidity and mortality rates.  Foundationally, METS 
depends on the following factors: 
• Acuity of the casualty; 
• Operational condition within AO; 
• Availability of medical evacuation assets; 
• Treatment capability of medical equipment, supplies, and staff; 
• Workload projection compared to treatment capacity. 
The movement of patients from one level of treatment to another for more 
definitive treatment, or between and within levels of treatment, requires in-depth 
18 
planning, adequate resourcing, and skillful execution.  As Kott (1999) states, “Probably 
the most challenging aspect in planning and scheduling medical evacuation operations 
has to do with the dynamics of a domain in which requirements and constraints 
continuously change over time.”  Medical planners must be attentive to a litany of factors 
that can greatly influence the efficiency and effectiveness of patient movement.  As 
described by NTTP 4-02.2 (2001), the most common of which are: 
• Tactical Situation 
• Availability of transportation 
• On-hand patient mix 
• Medical specialty capabilities & staffing levels 
• Class VIII status, medical equipment status 
• Location of HSS facilities, and pending displacement of facilities 
• Current bed status of facilities (beds occupied/not occupied) 
• Surgical backlog of each facility (patients and hours of surgery) 
• Number and location of patients by diagnostic category 
• Location of airfields or seaports 
• Condition of each patient (Is the patient stabilized enough to withstand 
travel?) 
• Communications capabilities 
• Availability of patient movement items (PMI) such as litters, monitors, 
etc. 
1. Patient Evacuation 
The objective of a robust evacuation system is to obtain the best possible 
infrastructure and asset allocation to leverage technology and medical specialists, while 
reducing risk by providing care further away from the dangers and constraints of the 
combat zone.  Patient evacuation is the timely and efficient transportation of wounded, 
injured, or ill personnel from the immediate area of operations to HSS facilities and, as 
required, between HSS facilities.  Evacuation begins at the location where the injury or 
illness takes place and continues as far rearward as the patient’s medical condition 
warrants and/or the military situation dictates.  In the lower levels in the continuum of 
care, patients are moved to the nearest HSS facility whereas in the higher levels, they are 
regulated to a designated facility (NTTP 4-02.2, 2001). 
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Similar to the triage process, patients are prioritized for evacuation by a hierarchal 
categorization that factors in their medical condition and the ability of the evacuation 
asset to transport each patient.  This categorization, as depicted in Table 1.2, determines 
how quickly a patient is targeted for evacuation within the patient movement system.  It 
is determined at the originating facility and may be upgraded or downgraded at each 
succeeding level of patient care (JP 4-02.2, 1996).  Medical regulators must factor a 
myriad of variables when assigning an evacuation priority, the most prominent of which 
is will the patient’s condition be exacerbated by conditions and limitations of the AO and 
the medical evacuation asset.  Prior to any evacuation, a patient must be stabilized 
enough to transit to the next MTF and within the medical capabilities of the receiving 
MTF. 
 
PATIENT MOVEMENT SYSTEM 




Patients who require emergency, short 
notice evacuation within a maximum of two 
hours to save life, limb, or eyesight and to 
prevent serious complications of the injury, 
serious illness, or permanent disability. 
Within 2 Hours 
PRIORITY 
(Priority II) 
Patients who require prompt medical care, 
within a maximum of four hours, to prevent 
the medical condition from deteriorating to 
an URGENT precedence, to prevent 
unnecessary pain or disability, or who 
require treatment not available locally. 
Within 4 Hours 
ROUTINE 
(Priority III) 
Patients who do not require immediate 
medical attention and whose condition is 
not expected to deteriorate significantly. 
Within 24 Hours 
CONVENIENCE 
(Priority IV) 
Patients for whom evacuation by medical 
vehicle is a matter of medical convenience 
rather than necessity. 
No Limit 
Table 1.2 Evacuation Time Periods (After JP 4-02.2, 1996; NTTP 4-02.2, 2001) 
Casualties are evacuated through the HSS system until they arrive at a facility 
having the capabilities required to begin decisive intervention, the time required to 
perform necessary procedures, and the bed capacity to retain the patient.  This MTF or 
level of care is defined as the site of principal treatment (NWP 4-02, 1995). 
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2. Theater Evacuation Policy 
The theater evacuation policy is set by the Secretary of Defense in coordination 
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and in agreement with the geographic combatant 
commander (COCOM) prior to operation plan (OPLAN) execution (JP 4-02.2, 1996).  
The policy designates the maximum number of days a patient may be held (treatment and 
recovery) at each level of care in the AO and combat theater.  If in the medical officer’s 
(MO) opinion, the casualty cannot return to duty (RTD) within the specified number of 
days, the casualty should be evacuated as soon as clinically and tactically possible.  
Traditionally, the evacuation policy is seven (7) days for the combat zone and a 
combined total of fifteen (15) days for the combat zone and the communications zone. 
This policy is flexible and can be adjusted by the COCOM as the tactical situation 
dictates.  As evidence of this it is common that if a stabilized patient who is clearly not 
going to be able to RTD within the Theater Evacuation Policy will be evacuated out of 
the immediate combat theater or CONUS for continued treatment, providing that 
evacuation will not exacerbate the patient’s condition (NTTP 4-02.2, 2001) 
In constructing an evacuation model, multiple dimensions of objectives, 
preferences, and constraints need to be balanced.  Some primary objectives include: 
• Minimizing the queue lengths of casualties awaiting evacuation. 
• Number of patients evacuated to appropriate level MTFs is maximized, 
with a weighted system favoring critical and urgent patients over routine 
ones. 
• Maximizing aircraft vehicle capacity use. 
• Minimizing the number of aircraft missions. 
• Minimizing flight time and number of stops during each flight. 
Theater evacuation policy has significant impact on the requirements for size, 
mobility, and capabilities of the HSS system.  Advocating a shorter or longer evacuation 
policy has ramifications that must be considered and applied carefully by the COCOM 
and Joint Forces Surgeon (JFS).  As stated within the Navy Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures manual (2001), every patient evacuated without sufficient reason imposes 
unnecessary burdens on: 
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• Their unit, which will be understaffed until the patient is returned or 
replaced. 
• The replacement system that must procure, train, and transport a 
replacement. 
• The HSS system that must provide bed space and personnel for each 
casualty. 
A shorter theater evacuation policy will result in fewer beds being required within 
the area of operations (AO), but the benefits of doing so may be offset by any of the 
following: 
• The cost of realigning more beds out of theater. 
• Creating greater demand and dependency on medical evacuation assets. 
• Reduce the number of casualties in theater that are able to RTD. 
• Cause MTFs to be overwhelmed if mass casualties occur and evacuation 
assets are unable to offset the casualty inflow. 
A longer theater evacuation policy will reduce bed requirements out of the theater 
and increase the proportion of casualties able to RTD, but it will also create the following 
issues: 
• Shift the beds requirement in-theater and necessitate larger MTFs within 
the AO. 
• Increase the population at risk (PAR) by maintaining more personnel 
within the combat zone. 
• Require greater utilization of medical supplies, logistics, and medical staff 
within the AO. 
3. Medical Regulating 
The continuity of care concept within the METS is accomplished through the 
execution of theater policy by medical regulators.  According to JP 4-02.2 (1996), 
medical regulating in itself “Entails identifying patients requiring medical care beyond 
that which is available at their present location, locating and assigning a patient to a 
hospital with appropriate capability, and coordinating the transportation means for 
movement.”  This process is vital as it ensures that both the bed capacity and medical 
capability are present at an MTF in order to maintain or better the health of any casualty. 
Patients are not regulated from Level I (Battalion Aid Stations (BASs), Beach 
Evacuation Stations (BESs) and Shock Trauma Platoons (STPs)) to Level II (Surgical 
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Company and Casualty Receiving and Treatment Ships (CRTS)), they are evacuated to 
the nearest medical entity.  At this level in the HSS system, only flow-through beds exist 
which consist of basic cots with no particular design specific to assist in medical care. 
True hospital beds exist only at Level III and above.  STPs and surgical companies 
holding beds are cots and may normally only hold patients for up to 72 hours only (NTTP 
4-02.2, 2001). 
4. Enroute Care 
A major complexity within the METS system is the locality and sustainment of 
necessary medical personnel and patient movement items (PMIs).  Neither are fixed 
assets and must accompany patients that are evacuated, thereby reducing the capacity at 
the sending MTF.  While some air evacuations are beginning to have organic medical 
personnel attached with them, it is still the expectation that the sending MTF supplies the 
necessary personnel and medical items.  This ensures that a continuity of care exists and 
the patient remains stabilized throughout the entire evacuation.  Due to the nature of this 
interdependence between treatment and evacuation, the capability of MTFs can be 
quickly depleted if the return of medical personnel and materiel do not match the outflow 
of casualties requiring enroute care evacuation. 
5. Special Considerations 
As with any operation, contingencies must be planned for both low probability-
high demand and high probability-low demand scenarios.  The most common of the 
former are CBRNE contaminated patients that present, causing major complexities within 
the treatment and evacuation processes.  According to Smith (1995), during the Gulf War 
of 1991, Naval HSS were told that contamination of patients could be seen in as much as 
15% of the casualty population.  Doctrinally, contaminated personnel will not routinely 
be enplaned on aeromedical evacuation aircraft as such an aircraft becomes contaminated 
as a result and lost from service until decontaminated (JP 4-02.2, 1996).  Thus, these 
patients require special medical attention and logistical support that further taxes the 
METS capacities. 
Of equal concern is the high-probability low-intensity scenario of  the treatment 
and evacuation of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs).  Per Geneva Conventions, EPW 
patients must receive the same quality of care provided to the detaining power’s own 
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troops.  Thus, they will compete for the same limited medical resources and evacuation 
assets as all other patients.  Doctrine indicates that “Qualified medical retained personnel 
(RP) will be used as much as possible in medical and hygiene work needed for the well-
being of EPWs (JP 4-02.2, 1996).”  However, even though the use of RP staff may 
alleviate the draw upon medical staff, the EPWs will still reduce limited medical supplies 
and the addition of RPs will further reduce available evacuation capacity. 
Additionally, as occurred in OIF, the protracted post-conflict insurgencies have 
required many of the mobile medical units to transform into fixed facilities within their 
area of responsibility (AOR).  According to Gawande (2004), this has brought a flood of 
Iraqi civilians (particularly pediatric patients) seeking care, overwhelming an already 
resource constrained medical capabilities.  Unless NATO or host nation support (HNS) is 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The preservation of the soldier’s health should 
be [the commander’s] first and greatest care.” 
- George Washington2 
 
A. MULTIPERIOD/INTER-TEMPORAL NETWORKS 
To date, inter-temporal or multi-period models have been almost exclusively 
utilized within the industrial and financial industries (Sahinidis and Grossmann, 1991).  
Initial utilization within the health care industry has lent much of the analysis to focus on 
either patient flow through a network or resource allocation, but none that have 
encapsulated both processes at once. 
The resource allocation process was addressed by van Zon and Kommer (1999) in 
a deterministic allocation model based upon the inter-temporal assumption that resource 
allocations within medical systems would most certainly affect those to be taken in the 
future.  As exhibited in Figure 2.1, the network delineates three specific stocks of patients 
(denoted by the W circles) who are in the beginning of the system at the beginning of a 
period. 
 
Figure 2.1 Inter-Temporal Model of Patient Flow (From van Zon & Kommer, 1999) 
 
                                                 
2 (As cited from Joint Pub 4.02, 2001) 
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The rectangles represent medical activities while the arcs are the flow of patients 
thru these activities.  Key findings from this model were that minimizing waiting times 
does not necessarily lead to an increase in welfare and may actually be counterproductive 
to policy goals.  In fact, as shown by others (Tavakoli, Davies, Malek, 1999), in some 
circumstances, targeting the waiting times may actually lengthen the queue or be 
counterproductive in the health management of patients (van Zon and Kommer, 1999).  
The model also emphasized that a quantifiable “shadow-price” could be associated to 
certain metrics thereby directly indicating the benefits that could be achieved thru 
different processes.  The information produced by the model provides the information 
necessary for decision makers to associate costs with specific policies that delineate how 
mismatches between the demand and supply of health-care can be mitigated. 
 
B. EVACUATION 
Cook (1977) delineated a medevac problem similar in its linear constraints to 
many generalized personnel scheduling problems.  Basing the model upon a deterministic 
patient inflow, the research exhibited that the model was useful in maintaining a set of 
medical service levels while minimizing required staff.  However, even with a simplified 
model, the solution was confounded by quadratic constraints and inability to meet all 
goals.  Thus, while feasible solutions were obtainable, they by their own omission did not 
necessarily take advantage of any special structuring inherent in the problem. 
Kott et al. (1999) presents a model that determine the optimal size and mix of 
means of transportation that satisfy certain operational requirements.  Findings included 
benefits in continuity by devising a dynamic replanning technique that regenerates plans 
while the currently executing plan is utilized as a constraint on the solution.  Similarly, 
Sundstrom et al. (1996) devised a linear program (OPTEVAC) that attempted to 
determine optimal placement and number of evacuation assets within a given theater of 
operations.  Utilizing the Probabilistic Location Set Covering Problem (ReVelle & 
Hogan, 1989), they were able to exhibit that significant resources of ground and air 
ambulances could be optimized within a specific theater of operations. 
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C. PATIENT FLOW AND RESOURCE MODELS 
Numerous studies (Harper, 2002; Harrison, 2001; Millard et al., 2004; Riggs, 
1978) highlight the inherent fact that demand for medical services often exceeds the 
supply and thus causes rationing of services.  In fact, queues, denial of treatment, or 
lowered intensity of delivered services should be expected and are critical measures for 
policy planners to focus on when assessing the operation of their organization.  
Additionally, these studies assist in creating awareness of the complex and dynamic 
nature of medical systems and support the necessity for models that reflect the 
uncertainty, variability, and limitations associated with accommodating actual patient 
demand. 
Lehaney, Kogetsidis, and Clarke (1996) utilized a PC windows-based simulation 
to model the variable demand emplaced upon hospital clinic resources caused by a range 
of scenarios.  The model while simple, exhibited effectiveness at quantifying the total 
time in system for patients who flowed along different routes within the clinical process 
and expressing queue build-ups at specific points. 
Application of the Harrison and Millard Flow Model (BOMPS) and Sorenston’s 
multi-phased bed model were utilized by Mackay (2001) to provide Australian health 
planners relevant information on patient flow, bed blockages, length of stay causations.  
This was extremely important as other research by Bagust, Place, and Posnett (1999) 
highlight that bed occupancy in excess of 90% may result in periodic bed crises in an 
acute care setting. 
D. MILITARY MEDICAL SIMULATION AND MODELING 
Modeling and Simulation (M&S) has long been used by the Navy in operational 
planning and has slowly expanded into the modeling of medical planning metrics as well. 
1. Medical Analysis Tool 
The Medical Analysis Tool (MAT) remains the primary tool with which planners 
in the J4 shop determine the level and scope of medical support needed for a joint 
operation.  Its mainstay modules consist of a medical requirements estimator (MRE) and 
a course of action (COA) planner that can be used for both deliberate and crisis-action 
planning.  Specifically, MAT is effective at exhibiting requirements for beds, operating 
rooms, blood items, and personnel required to complement the projected patient casualty 
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rates.  MAT also identifies bottlenecks within the medical system and reports out a risk 
assessment based upon the associated HSS system (Marghella, 2003).  While remaining 
an instrumental decision aid in current operational planning for medical services, MAT is 
still viewed by many providers and planners an “Incomplete tool for providing the 
fidelity and type of planning data needed to support medical operations (Medical 
Seabasing, 2004).” 
2. Tactical Medical Analysis Tool 
The Tactical Medical Analysis Tool (TML+) is a simulation driven model that 
primarily deals with flow of patients from the point of injury through more definitive 
care.  It has further developed into a tool that can be utilized for operational risk 
assessment and medical services planning. 
TML+ builds upon some of these previous models and further enhances the 
ability to model a patient flow of casualties within a specific network of treatment 
facilities from POI to definitive treatment.  Other additions include the ability to simulate 
the treatment times and demands on consumable supplies, equipment, personnel, and 
transportation assets in the AO (Tropeano, Konoske, et al., 2003).  Utilized with 
additional planning tools, TML+ maintains excellent capabilities in both deliberate and 
crisis action planning. 
.
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III. METCOM DESIGN & UTILIZATION 
"Blood is the price of victory" 
    - Karl von Clausewitz3 
 
A. OBJECTIVES OF THE MODEL 
The primary objective of METCOM is that thru the utilization of specific 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) design an integrated METS network that will provide 
quantitative data to decision makers in order to facilitate better functioning and strategic 
integration of the HSS system into the overall concept of operations.  The model centers 
on the treatment and evacuation capacities in order to highlight the effects that deployed 
medical infrastructure and policy have on the pre-defined MOEs.  Specifically, the model 
focuses on the integration of Level II and III MTFs within the METS as these LOCs 
constitute the major medical delivery assets within the forward theater of operations and 
have significant capability to negate or reduce mortality and morbidity levels of the 
population at risk.  Additionally, of all the LOCs, Levels II and III have the greatest 
potential and adaptability to change their design, structure, and capabilities to meet 
evolving operational needs and future strategic initiatives. 
The model is targeted to address the following key issues:  
1. For a given operational scenario in a certain theater of operations, what 
is the optimal METS structure and most efficient mix of evacuation and 
medical treatment capabilities at each LOC such that specific MOEs are 
satisfied? 
2. Given a specific METS structure, what policy is most effective with 
regards to chosen MOEs? 
3. How sensitive are the MOEs to the METS structure, applicable theater 
policies, and casualty flow fluctuations that are predicted to occur over 
the length of the OPLAN.  
                                                 
3 As cited from  http://www.jmacsnippets.net/Quotes_Clausewitz.htm, April, 2005 
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B. STRUCTURE OF THE GENERAL METS NETWORK 
The Medical Evacuation and Treatment System (METS) is represented as a 
multiperiod network that captures the structural and operational dimensions of delivering 
combat healthcare and executing medical evacuations (MEDEVACs).  METCOM allows 
for the analysis of alternative METS structures and policies and exhibits how such 
alternatives would affect key measures of effectiveness (MOEs).  Figure 3.1 exhibits the 
generic setup by depicting the structural dimension of METS consisting of levels of care 
(LOC) along the vertical axis, and time periods along the horizontal axis.  Within each 
block of the time-level network, the operational dimensions consisting of the dual 
processes of treatment and evacuation are represented. 
 
Figure 3.1 METS General Network 
 
Each node in the METS network represents a servicing point for medical 
treatment or evacuation with associated priorities and constraints.  The circular nodes 
represent the medical treatment facility (MTF) where the treatment process is carried out 
while the block nodes represent the mobile aeromedical staging facility (MASF) which 
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conducts the evacuation process.  Casualties flow from node to node along the arcs of the 
network with those in a queue represented by a dashed arc and those in the midst of a 
treatment or evacuation process represented by a solid arc.  As the inflow of casualties 
arrive at each node the process of treatment or evacuation is governed by a specific 
priority rule based upon a theater treatment and evacuation policy that is generally 
directed by the COCOM or JFS.  Specific policies will be addressed later in this chapter 
as they constitute a major driving force on the effectiveness and efficiency of the METS 
network. 
Although Figure 3.1 depicts just two levels of care (i=2), the full network would 
consist of medical treatment being phased through the structure of up to five LOCs (i≤ 5) 
with basic first aid beginning at Level I and progressing towards definitive care provided 
at a Level V CONUS medical treatment facility.  The time period of the scenario is 
exhibited as occurring over three time periods (S=3), but practical application of 
METCOM allows for operational length to be set per the medical planners’ and 
regulators’ choosing, or simply the time horizon given in the operation plan (OPLAN). 
Additionally, the defined length of the time periods remains flexible and is user 
selected in order to allow for testing time period effects on the METS network, compare 
alternative policies, or simply fit most appropriately with the time-phased force 
deployment data (TPFDD).  The variability in time resolution may result in significant 
topology adjustments in the METS network.  For example, the MOEs may exhibit stark 
differences in the induced graphs if the time step is changed (e.g. 1 hour to 3 hours) while 
holding the length of treatment constant at three hours.  This feature is particularly useful 
when wishing to ascertain different time-dependent casualty flow rate affects upon key 
MOEs.  Such scenarios, as a spike in injuries induced from a mass casualty incident(s), 
can be modeled by shortening the time periods which causes an increase in arrival rate 
and necessitates greater utilization of the METS network.  On the opposite spectrum, if 
long durations of minimal patient flows are warranted as seen in many low-intensity or 
post-conflict scenarios, the time periods can be lengthened, causing arrival rates to 
decrease.   
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C. GENERAL METS NETWORK PROCESSES 
For simplicity we assume that the METS is modeled such that any single process 
(treatment or evacuation) takes exactly one time period to complete. As discussed above, 
different time scales induce different graph topologies.  Since both processes cannot 
occur in the same time period for the same casualty, planners must prioritize whether a 
casualty will be evacuated or treated in each period.  This necessitates a flexible yet 
resource constrained policy that outlines the appropriate prioritization for treatment and 
evacuation timelines for casualties and significantly impacts the structural requirements 
of the METS.  Further, this policy represents the theater treatment and evacuation policy 
that will be executed and maintained by the COCOM.  The basic flows of the General 
METS network are defined next. We define three auxiliary variables: MTF Input, 
EvacStaging and MTF Exit that represent a population of casualties at a given time and 
place within the METS. 
System Arrivals: 
In general, casualties arrive at a MTF either from the battlefield or from a lower 
LOC.  At LOC I, new arrivals consist of the combat casualties incurred in the current 
time period.  This flow is supplemented with casualties that have been delayed in the 
treatment queue from the previous period.  As this is the lowest LOC, casualties cannot 
be received via any type of evacuation flow occurring from lower level MTFs. 
At LOC II thru LOC V, new arrivals consist of casualties received via the 
evacuation flow from a lower level of care in the previous time period.  Just as at LOC I, 
this is supplemented with casualties that have been delayed in the treatment queue of that 
MTF from the previous period.  Due to the tiered structure of the METS, new casualties 
in the combat zone are received only at LOC I, thus at all higher LOCs no casualties are 
directly received from the combat field.  The balance equations for the inflow of 
casualties are as follows: 
 LOC I Specific: 
 
Casualties Delayed treatment flow from New combat casualties.
entering the the previous time period.
MTF.
 ( ) ( 1) ( )MTF Input t TreatmentQueue t NewCasualties t= − +	
 	
 	
  (3.1) 
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 LOC II thru LOC V Specific: 
 
Casualties Delayed treatment flow from Those evacuated from a lower
entering the the previous time period. LOC from the previous time
MTF.





  (3.2) 
Treatment: 
All casualties can be treated up to the extent of the medical capacity of the MTF, 
which is driven by availability of supplies, equipment, personnel, blood products, beds, 
combat environment, and a host of other internal and external factors.  If policy allows or 
requires the MTF to accept a greater number of casualties than its treatment capacity, 
then casualties above the capacity will be delayed in a medical queue that flows into the 
next time period as represented by the horizontal dotted arc Treatment Queue.  The 
balance equation for medical treatment and the associated treatment queue are derived 
from the following: 
 ( )  ( ) ( ) ( )Treatment t MTF Input t DirectEvacuation t TreatmentQueue t= − −  (3.3) 
Evacuation: 
Similarly, the evacuation flow is also subject to maximum capacity constraints 
that are determined by the availability of evacuation assets’ (dedicated, designated, lifts 
of opportunity), applicable litter and seat configuration, requirement for patient 
movement items (PMIs), organic medical personnel and equipment, and feasible 
evacuation range.  Casualties that satisfies the maximum evacuation capacity constraints 
will be evacuated to the next higher LOC in the next time period as represented by the arc 
from Evac Staging(t) → MTF Input(t+1).  However, patients above the capacity will be 
delayed in a staging queue as represented by the horizontal dotted arc Evacuation Queue 
flowing from Evac Staging(t) →  Evac Staging(t+1).  The balance equation of the 
evacuation flow and the associated queue are derived from the following: 
The evacuation Casualties being evacuated Casualties who were delayed
staging area. with no treatment in in the evac que
time period t.




ue from the treatment in the previous
previous time period. time period and were sent
for evacuation.





Casualties that complete one time period of treatment are considered completed 
with treatment (CompTre) at that LOC and are either returned to duty (RTD) or require 
more definitive care and are sent to the staging area in preparation for evacuation to the 
next higher LOC in the next time period.  This latter process is represented in the 
Completed Treatment arc that flows from the MTF Exit(t) →  Evac Staging(t+1).  
Casualties completing Casualties treated Casualties sent directly
one time period of in period t. to evacuation staging
treatment.





the current time period
( )tQueue t	
  (3.5) 
Casualties physically exit the network via the treatment process that either 
provides definitive care and is able to return the casualty to duty (RTD) or is unable to 
save the casualty’s life which constitutes a Died of Wounds (DOW) end state.  It should 
also be noted that the highest LOC V, which is not modeled in our design, is an absorbing 
state as patients will not RTD or evacuate from this MTF to any additional nodes.  The 
RTD proportion is based upon the propensity that a number of casualties who complete a 
period of treatment will have received satisfactory treatment to be redeployed to combat 
operations.  This is accomplished through multiplying the number of completed 
treatments in a time period by a parameter ( )α  that specifies what proportion of 
casualties who complete treatment at a specific LOC will RTD.  Casualties that are fully 
treated and ready to return to duty exit the network via the RTD arc emanating from the 
MTF Exit node. 
 ( )  ( )RTD t MTF Exit tα=   (3.6) 
Although it is acknowledged that the issue of DOW is significant morally, 
emotionally and politically, it was explicitly removed from the METS model for two 
primary reasons.  First, incorporating a zero DOW policy leads to a greater number of 
casualties to remain in the system, thereby creating greater utilization of the METS.  This 
allows for the METS network to be maximally stressed and exhibit the system’s 
functioning capacity when the worst case number of casualties are received and 
35 
maintained in the system.  Second, the DOW casualty population is easily encompassed 
into other categorical casualty populations that will be discussed later in this chapter. 
D. METS THEATRE POLICY 
As previously discussed, theater METS policy must be aligned with operational 
plans and objectives while weighing the resource and human costs associated with a 
potential course of action (COA).  Specifically, the COCOM must decide whether METS 
policy will be geared more heavily towards evacuation, medical treatment, or some mix 
between the two.  Each COA may produce significantly different casualty flows and 
thereby produce competing options for decision makers to select during specific combat 
operations.  METCOM is designed to exhibit how different policies affect different 
casualty flows and may result in different outcomes of the MOEs.  Thus, METCOM can 
assist the decision maker in choosing a policy that best meets and sustains the appropriate 
level of casualty care warranted by the MOEs. 
Figure 3.2 below exhibits the architecture of a more detailed model in which 
variations of the METS policy can be evaluated.  Similarly to the general network, the 
METS policy network is structured as five LOCs (i≤ 5) with basic first aid beginning at 
LOC I and progressing towards definitive care provided at a LOC V CONUS medical 
treatment facility (MTF).  The medical treatment process has 3 nodes Input, Intermed, 
and Exit that represent the phased treatment processes (GenTre & SpecTre) within the 
MTF.  Once again, GenTre represents the basic medical services such as physical 
examination, vital-checks, and general bed allocation that every casualty receives while 
SpecTre represents the specialty medical care such as intensive care, surgery, or 
diagnostic testing done only on patients that warrant such specific care.  The evacuation 
process has 1 node labeled Evac Stage that represents the mobile aeromedical staging 
facility (MASF) where casualties await assignment of seats on the medical evacuation 
asset.  For this specific model this staging area is considered removed from the 
configured bed capacity of the MTF.  Casualties flow along the arcs from node to node 
and are identified as being in queue by a dashed arc or actively in a process by a solid arc. 
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The arcs in the more detailed METS network are as follows: 
  Where  i = the level of care 
    c = triage category 
    w = evacuation priority 
• ( )1 , 2 , 1 , 2i i i icw cw cw cwT T T Q T Q  represent the flow of casualties within the medical 
treatment process either receiving or waiting to receive a particular phase of care. 
• T1 is the flow of casualties receiving GenTre. 
• T2 is the flow of casualties receiving SpecTre. 
• T1Q is the flow of casualties in a medical queue who have not received any 
care. 
• T2Q is the flow of casualties in a medical queue who have received GenTre 
but not SpecTre. 
• ( )1 , 2 , 3 ,i i i icw cw cw cwH H H HQ  represent the flow of casualties within the evacuation 
staging process at the MASF or attempting to proceed to the next higher LOC. 
• H1 is the flow of casualties to the MASF with NonTre. 
• H2 is the flow of casualties to the MASF who have received GenTre only. 
• H3 is the flow of casualties to the MASF who have received CompTre. 
• HQ is the flow of casualties with the evacuation queue at the MASF. 
• ( )icwE  represents the flow of casualties that have cleared the (MASF) and are 
processing to the next higher LOC.  
Each of these arcs is discussed more at length in the following sections.  The 
resulting METS descriptive policy network has been structurally modified from the 
general network to add more realism to the delivery of treatment as well as differentiate 
casualty flow by type and severity of injury.  Some of the important structural 
implications of the METS network include: 
• Having the T2Q casualties flow to the Input node rather than Intermed node  
allows for the priority policy to be implemented each time period in a more 
efficient manner.  In that, casualties flowing on the T2Q arc have the ability to 
be evacuated in the very next time period from the Input node vice waiting an 
additional time period if the arc were to flow into the Intermed node.  Also, if 
remained in treatment, they consume GenTre resources (capacity). 
 
• Having the H2 and H3 casualties flow to the Evac Stage node in the next time 
period versus the current time period represents that the two competing 
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processes of treatment and evacuation cannot be carried out in the same 
period. 
These changes are discussed more at length below and include the following 
modifications; delineation of medical treatment into a two-phased process, incorporation 
of multiple queues within an MTF, and multiple casualty flow through the use of Triage 
Categories (TriCats) and Evacuation Priorities (EvaPris). 
Phased Treatment: 
The two-phase treatment process is described by 3 nodes labeled Input, Intermed, 
and Exit.  This divisional treatment setup is representative of the fact that all casualties 
receive general treatment for their wounds and consume general medical resources such 
as beds, while only some require additional specialty treatment such as surgery or 
intensive care.  While both treatment types may be accomplished in the same time period, 
as previously stated, any treatment activity that is done on a casualty will constitute 
significant usage of the time period and will functionally negate evacuation until the next 
time period. 
This model assumption is exhibited in the three unique flows of casualties within 
the evacuation process.  H2 and H3 represent casualties that have received general 
treatment (GenTre) only and complete treatment (CompTre) respectively.  That is, the 
flow on H2 represents casualties that did not receive specialty treatment (SpecTre) and 
are being evacuated while the H3 edge represents those casualties who did receive 
SpecTre and are being evacuated.  However, as both H2 and H3 have received at least 
some treatment during this time period, they may not be fully evacuated beyond the 
MASF until the next time period.  H1 represents new casualties or casualties who have 
arrived from lower LOCs who receive no treatment at the current LOC.  They either 
warrant evacuation priority over medical treatment or they could not be accommodated 
by the medical treatment process (they were above GenTre capacity) and are sent directly 




Figure 3.2 METS Descriptive Model 
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Casualty Flows: 
The arrival of new casualties to the system in the expanded METS network 
images the process of the general network.  However, as the treatment of casualties is 
now represented in two phases, general and specialty, there exists an additional set of 
queues that maintain casualties in a delayed medical status at the MTF.  These and the 
other arrivals to the system are represented in the following flows: 
• New combat casualties of type cw ( )1cwd  that arrive to the system (occurs only at 
LOC I). 
• Evacuated casualties of type cw ( )icwE  from LOC (i-1) that arrive to LOC i (occurs 
for i= II thru V). 
• Treatment queue 1  ( )1 icwT Q  into the Input node of the MTF represents the flow of 
patients who have received no prior treatment (NonTre) at this level of care and are 
being delayed in the medical treatment queue. 
• Treatment queue 2 ( )2 icwT Q into the Input node of the MTF represents the flow of 
patients who received prior General Treatment (GenTre) but not Specialty Treatment 
(SpecTre) and are being delayed in the medical queue. 
Multicommodity Flow: 
The acuity level of casualties presenting for treatment in each LOC is driven by 
the patient TriCats that consists of four triage categories (c=1,…,4).  These TriCats, as 
explicitly defined in Chapter I, are associated with acuity of injury and are one basis for 
decision makers to utilize in determining policy on priority for medical treatment.  The 
default policy of METCOM represents the typical policy which places priority on saving 
life and limb over treating all patients equally.  Thus, immediate casualties have the 
highest priority followed by urgent, minimal, and expectant in successive prioritization 
order.  Change to this policy will implicitly change requirements within the METS and 
may have a host of effects upon the MOEs.  This is a key flexibility of METCOM as it 
can adaptively change to warranted prioritization policies and reflect outcome measures 
that assist decision makers in selecting policies that contain acceptable outcomes and 
risk. 
Much like the medical process utilizes TriCats for identifying treatment 
prioritization, the evacuation process utilizes Evacuation Priorities (EvaPris) of casualties 
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to assign precedence for MEDEVAC.  These EvaPris, also explicitly defined in Chapter 
I, are associated with the TriCats and the current evacuation propensity for each casualty 
type.  They are categorized into a four tier (w=1,…,4) hierarchy consisting of: urgent, 
priority, routine, and convenience.  Although very similar to the triage categorizations, 
there is not a simple 1:1 conversion from TriCat to EvaPri as many factors associated 
with assigning a TriCat in a stable, immobile medical unit are different than factors 
influencing an evacuation capability.  For example, medical regulators must consider a 
litany of internal and environmental factors such as whether there’s appropriate medical 
equipment, personnel, structural setup of the evacuation asset, PMI’s, and time to conduct 
an evacuation.  Additionally, some acute medical conditions may not allow for 
evacuation due to a casualty’s mobility constraints, air pressure or altitude constraints for 
both patient and medical equipment, or even motion of the evacuation asset exacerbating 
the medical condition. 
Again, the default policy of METCOM represents the typical policy which places 
priority on saving life and limb over treating all patients equally.  Thus, urgent casualties 
have the highest priority followed by priority, routine, and convenience in diminishing 
prioritization order.  METCOM also allows for sub-policies that change evacuation 
priorities, which again assists in comparative analysis of key MOEs between alternative 
policies. 
The actual assignment of TriCat and EvaPri is accomplished through the 
following process as explained below: 
• Planners input the overall casualties expected.  This is generally based 
upon historical data, input from the military service communities, and 
COCOM on the intensity and risk associated with the expected OPLAN. 
• A probability matrix ( )tΠ  as exhibited in Table 3.1 for a certain time 
period is utilized to assign a specific TriCat and EvaPri indices to each 
casualty of the input population.  Each (c,w) entry in this matrix is the 
probability that a casualty will be a specific TriCat-EvaPri indexed 
casualty.  This probability matrix is based upon historical data, type and 





 w1 w2 w3 w4 
c1 0.10 0.10 0.0 0.0 
c2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.05 
c3 0.0 0.0 0.10 0.05 
c4 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.10 
Table 3.1 TriCat (c) & EvaPri (w) Probability Matrix 
As represented by Equation 3.1 the overall casualties and probability matrix 
generate ( )cwd t , which explicitly enumerates the number of new combat casualties of 
type (c,w) at time period t.  This is represented by a 4 x 4 matrix consisting of TriCat 
(c=1,…,4) and EvaPri (w=1,…,4) indexed casualties. 
 
 ( ) ( # ( )) ( )cw cwd t Total Casualties t t= ×Π    (3.7) 
where ( )cw tΠ is the cw entry of ( )tΠ  
An essential property, which is a result of incorporating TriCats and EvaPris 
within the METS, is that the resulting network is multi-commodity.  In fact, every arc 
contains sixteen (c=4 and w=4) categories of unique casualty categories whose flow is 
subject to influence by the prioritizations stated in the standing METS policy and sub-
policies.  Thus, medical planners can differentiate how alternative policies affect 
individual casualty categories and will further assist in determining whether the 
respective level of efficiency and effectiveness created in the METS meets determined 
MOEs. 
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1. Descriptive Network Formulation 
The formal representation of the descriptive model associated with Figure 3.2 is 
shown below: 
Indices 
t - Time period     where t = 1…T 
i - Medical level of care (LOC)   where i = 1,…,5 
c - Triage category of casualty (TriCat)  where c = 1,…,4 
w - Evacuation priority category (EvaPri)  where w = 1,…,4 
Given Data 
S  Number of time periods of the operation. 
( )cwd t   Number of new combat casualties of class (c,w) at time period t. 
( )icw tα   Proportion of class (c,w) casualties at level of care i that have 
received complete treatment and are returned to duty in time period t. 
( )cwP t   The amount of general evacuation resources needed by a casualty 
of class (c,w). 
cwΠ   Probability that a given new casualty is of class (c,w) 
Decision Variables 
( )iTreCapG t  General treatment capacity at level of care i in period t. 
( )icTreCapS t  Specialty treatment capacity of type c casualty at level of care i in 
time period t. 
( )iEvaCapG t  General evacuation capacity at level of care i in period t. 




1 ( )icwT t  Number of casualties of class (c,w) at level of care i that are 
receiving General Treatment (GenTre) in bed at the MTF during time period t. 
2 ( )icwT t  Number of casualties of class (c,w) at level of care i that are 
receiving Specialty Treatment of type c (SpecTrec) in bed at the MTF during time period 
t. 
1 ( )icwT Q t  Number of casualties of class (c,w) at current level of care i having 
received no treatment and delayed in a queue during time period t.  This queue is labeled 
Non-Treatment (NonTre) queue. 
2 ( )icwT Q t  Number of casualties of class (c,w) at current level of care i having 
received general treatment in bed and then delayed in a queue for specialty treatment 
during time period t.  This queue is labeled GenTre queue. 
1 ( )icwH t  Number of casualties of class (c,w) at current level of care i having 
received no treatment at that level and sent directly to evacuation staging in time period t. 
2 ( )icwH t  Number of casualties of class (c,w) at current level of care i having 
received GenTre in bed and sent to evacuation staging in time period t+1 before receiving 
SpecTrec. 
3 ( )icwH t  Number of casualties of class (c,w) at current level of care i having 
received complete treatment (CompTre) during time period t and are sent to evacuation 
staging in time period t+1. 
( )icwHQ t  Number of patients of class (c,w) at the current level of care i 
during period t being delayed in an evacuation queue. 
( )icwE t   Number of patients of class (c,w) at the current level of care i 
during time period t being evacuated to level of care i + 1. 
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( )icwRTD t  Number of casualties of class (c,w) at current level of care i who 
are Returned to Duty during time period t. 
Balance of Flow 
METCOM utilizes four specific auxiliary variables that assist in encapsulating 
pools of casualty flows during each time period.  Specifically the medical treatment 
process incorporates the three nodes of Input, Intermed, and Exit that represent the 
following: 
Input:  The pool of casualties that are arriving via new casualties to the system, 
delayed in medical hold from the previous time period, or from an evacuation asset from 
a lower echelon.  This pool represents the population of casualties for that specific LOC 
and time period that must be prioritized for either treatment or evacuation given the 
capacity constraints. 
LOC I Specific: 
 N
Newly arrivingInflow of NonTre queue GenTre queue
casualties tocasualties from previous from previous period.
the METSat MTF period
( ) 1 ( 1) 2 ( 1) ( )i i icw cw cw cwInput t T Q t T Q t d t= − + − +	
 	
 	
  (3.8) 
LOC II thru LOC V Specific: 
 1
Inflow of NonTre queue GenTre queue Evacuated casualties
casualties from previous from previous period. from level i-1 in
at MTF period previous per
( ) 1 ( 1) 2 ( 1) ( 1)i i i icw cw cw cwInput t T Q t T Q t E t
−






  (3.9) 
 
Intermed:  The pool of casualties that have been prioritized for medical treatment 
at the LOC and have thus far received GenTre only.  They are again awaiting 
prioritization for further SpecTre or evacuation per the capacity constraints. 
 
Number of casualites GenTre
who've completed GenTre. casualties.
i = 1,...,5
c = 1,...,4
( ) 1 ( )     i icw cwIntermed t T t=	
 	
   (3.10) 
Exit:  The pool of casualties that have completed both general and specialty 




to the next higher LOC.  Evacuating to higher LOCs represents the presumption that the 






( ) 2 ( )      i icw cwExit t T t=	
 	
       (3.11) 
Evacuation:  The evacuation process contains one node, EvacStage, which 
constitutes a pool of casualties located at a MASF that range from those with no prior 
treatment to those with completed treatment at lower LOCs.  The casualties within this 
node are then comparatively prioritized for evacuation and are sent to the next higher 
LOC if they are below the capacity constraint of the evacuation asset(s).  If this pool of 
casualties is above the capacity of the evacuation asset, they will be delayed in an 
evacuation queue. 
 Medical Evac MASF Queue NonTre GenTre CompTre
MASF Casualties Casualties Casualties







The remaining computations for the multi-commodity arc flows are explicitly 
enumerated in Appendix B. 
2. Selected Priority Flow Policies 
As previously discussed, the organizational structure and designation of 
appropriate processes is only part of ensuring the efficient and effective operation of the 
METS.  Functionally, it is driven by the policies and procedures that dictate the 
prioritizing of casualties and METS assets towards medical treatment, evacuation, or 
some mixture of the two.  It is paramount to include prioritization policies within the 
network flow that will represent the COCOM and JFS desires on a medical treatment or 
evacuation oriented emphasis of the METS policy and structure.  Thus in terms of the 
model, priority of casualty flow is divided into two types of Primary Priority Policies 
(PPPs):  Treatment first, or Evacuation first.  Each of these policies in themselves can 
have multiple sub-policies that dictate how competition for medical or evacuation 
capacities is conducted per specific casualty category.  METCOM addresses these two 
PPPs, along with two sub-policies that are further explained below. 
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Primary Priority Policies (PPPs): 
A Treatment Priority Policy (TPP) advocates that the first process attempted at 
any given time period is to provide medical treatment to all casualties.  Only if casualties 
are above treatment capacities or have completed a full period of treatment will they be 
attempted to be evacuated.  If evacuation capacity is constraining as well, then all 
casualties who’ve not completed treatment are delayed in the treatment queue rather than 
the evacuation queue.  However, casualties with CompTre and above evacuation capacity 
(EvaCapG or EvaCapS) will by default policy be placed in the evacuation queue. 
The reciprocal of this is the Evacuation Priority Policy (EPP), which attempts as 
the first process at any given time period to evacuate all casualties.  If casualties are 
above the general evacuation capacity (EvaCapGi) or the specialty evacuation capacity 
(EvaCapSiw), they will then be attempted to be treated.  Again, if above the treatment 
capacity as well, casualties will be delayed in the treatment queue rather than the 
evacuation queue. 
Priority Sub-Policies (PSPs): 
Each of the primary policies may also maintain multiple priority sub-policies 
(PSPs) that direct how capacities are competed for amongst TriCat or EvaPri categories.  
For example, casualties on the evacuation staging arcs 
1 ( 1), 2 ( ), 3 ( ) , ( )i i i icw cw cw cwH t H t H t HQ t+  all compete for prioritization of the limited 
evacuation capacity ( 1)iEvaCapG t +  and then compete a second time for the casualty 
specific evacuation capacity ( 1)iwEvaCapS t + .  Deciding how priorities will be allocated 
can have significant effect on the flow of casualties through the METS. 
The first PSP addressed in METCOM consists of advocating for continuity of 
care and is deemed a GenTre Priority Sub-Policy (GPSP).  Specifically it directs that all 
casualties who have received general treatment (GenTre) and are being evacuated, as 
represented by the arc 2 ( )icwH t , will have complete priority for the evacuation capacity 
(EvaCapG & EvaCapSw) over all others at that LOC.  The GenTre flow will reduce the 
general evacuation capacity in time period (t+1) by however many casualties are sent to 
the staging area, leaving any remaining capacity for the next highest prioritization, 
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NonTre ( 1 ( 1))icwH t +  casualties in the next time period.  Thus, casualties who have 
received GenTre only are more likely than NonTre or CompTre casualties to move to the 
next LOC and continue their medical treatment. 
Those already in the evacuation queue ( ( 1))icwHQ t −  will have the next 
prioritization followed by the CompTre ( 3 ( ))icwH t  flow.  This prioritization also allows 
for control over who is placed in the evacuation queue.  Specifically, H1 and H2 casualty 
flows are not sent for evacuation unless they are guaranteed allowable capacity exists for 
their general needs (Pcw) and specialty evacuation priority (w) needs.  As stated 
previously, the CompTre flow H3 is by default sent to the evacuation staging area in 
order to free up medical bed space at the MTF whether or not evacuation capacity still 
exists at the staging facility.  Thus, if the general or special evacuation capacity is 
inadequate for any CompTre casualty, they will be forced into the evacuation queue 
where they will remain until capacity does become available.   
The second sub-policy addressed is the Balanced Priority Sub-Policy (BPSP) 
which considers the same casualty flows as before, but prioritizes ( 2 ( ), 1 ( 1))i icw cwH t H t +  
purely by EvaPri.  Here, higher priority EvaPris from both flows have evacuation 
precedence over all lower EvaPris.  It is still up to decision makers to direct how 
equivalent EvaPris from the casualty flows will compete against each other.  The current 
METCOM default is to give priority to GenTre casualties when comparing an identical 
EvaPri to the NonTre casualty flow.  Again, the evacuation queue (HQ) and CompTre 
(H3) are given third and fourth priority for capacity respectively. 
Specifically, in any treatment oriented policy prioritization within a certain TriCat 
is according to EvaPri, and in any Evacuation oriented policy the prioritization within a 
certain EvaPri is according to TriCat.  However, for both policies, the population of 
casualties who have completed treatment at the LOC ( 3 ( ))icwH t  will not have any priority 
for the evacuation staging capacity represented by ( 1)iEvaCapG t + .  This is 
characteristic of the standard medical policy that once treatment has been completed, a 
casualty will be removed from the medical treatment bed and repositioned in an 
evacuation staging bed, thereby allowing for greater treatment capacities of new 
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casualties at the MTF.  Once at the evacuation staging area, this population of casualties 
will compete with all the other casualty flows for actual evacuation space ( ( ))iwEvaCapS t  
aboard the evacuation asset transiting to the next higher LOC.   
E. TPP-GPSP EXAMPLE 
To better exhibit how these policies actually affect casualty flow, the 
computational equations are enumerated below and further discussion highlights the 
ramifications when the TPP and GPSP are emplaced in the METCOM network. 
Determining the Flow of Casualties in GenTre 
The flow of T1cw casualties is determined by the minimal value of: 
• Those at the MTF awaiting GenTre. 
• The remaining general treatment capacity after all casualties with more acute TriCat 





casualties Minimum of either GenTre capacity minus sum of all
higher priority triage casualties present
OR
The total 
1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ), ( )
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i i i i i
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= − −⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∑∑ ∑	

number of casualties present at that specific TriCat 




Determining the Flow of Casualties in SpecTrec 
The flow of T2cw casualties is determined by the minimal value of: 
• Those who have received GenTre and are awaiting SpecTre 
• The remaining specialty treatment capacity after all casualties with more 





SpecTre Minimum of the specific TriCat capacity remaining.
OR
The total number of GenTre casualties present
for the TriCat.
2 ( ) ( ) 2 , 1 ( )
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i i i i
cw c cj cw
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Determining the Flow of Casualties That Are Sent to the Evacuation Staging Area 
After Receiving GenTre But Not SpecTre 
The flow of H2cw casualties is determined by the minimal value of: 
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• Those who have received GenTre but not SpecTre. Make bullets .5 from 
left margin 
• The remaining general evacuation capacity after higher priority H2 
casualties are deducted.  
• The remaining specialty evacuation capacity after higher priority H2 
casualties are deducted. 
Formally, 
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 (3.15) 
Determining the Flow of Casualties That Are Sent to the Staging Area After Not 
Receiving Any Treatment (NonTre) at the Current LOC 
The flow of H1cw casualties is determined by the minimal value of: 
• Those who arrive at the MTF but do not receive GenTre. 
• The remaining general evacuation capacity after the following are 
deducted: 
• All H2 casualties that are evacuated as in (3.15). 
• Higher priority H1 casualties. 
• The remaining specialty evacuation capacity after the following are 
deducted: 
• All H2 casualties that are evacuated as in (3.15). 
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Determining the Flow of Casualties Waiting for GenTre 
The flow of T1Qcw casualties is determined by the value of: 
• Those who arrive at the MTF and are not sent to GenTre or the EvacStage. 
 
 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )i i i icw cw cw cwT Q t Input t T t H t= − −   (3.17) 
Determining the Flow of Casualties Who Have Received GenTre and are Awaiting 
SpecTre 
The flow of T2Qcw casualties is determined by the value of: 
• Those who have received GenTre but not SpecTre and are not sent to the 
EvacStage. 
 
 2 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( )i i i icw cw cw cwT Q t T t T t H t= − −   (3.18) 
Determining the Flow of Casualties That are Sent to the Staging Area After 
Receiving Both GenTre and SpecTre  
The flow of H3cw casualties is determined by the value of: 
• Those who have received SpecTre but are not RTD. 
 
 3 ( ) 2 ( ) ( )i i icw cw cwH t T t RTD t= −   (3.19) 
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Determining the Flow of Casualties Being Evacuated  
The flow E of casualties is determined by the sum of H1, H2 and the minimal 
value of: 
• The number of H3 and HQ casualties of type (c,w) awaiting evacuation at 
the MASF. 
• The remaining general evacuation capacity after H1 and H2 casualty flows 
are deducted. 
• The remaining specialty evacuation capacity after all casualties of H1 and 
H2 plus higher priority H3 and HQ (same EvaPri AND higher precedent 












3 ( 1) ( 1)
( ) 3 ( 1) ( 1)]













H t HQ t
EvaCapG t P H t HQ t








































1 1 1n Higher priority casualties
capacity that being evacuated EvaPris with higher
TriCat priority
[ 2 ( 1) 1 ( )] [ 3 ( 1) ( 1)]
c c
i i i i
cw cw jw jw jw
c j j











⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎭
  
(3.20) 
Determining the Flow of Casualties Waiting to be Evacuated  
The flow of HQcw casualties is determined by the value of: 
• Those casualties who have been sent to or delayed in the evacuation 
staging area and not sent to the next higher LOC. 
 
 
EvacuatedCasualties in NonTre GenTre CompTre Casualties in
CasualtStaging Queue Casualties Casualties Casualties Staging Queue







   , ,i c w∀  (3.21) 
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All casualties who have completed one time period of treatment at a LOC are 
represented in the ( )icwExit t  node located in the network as exhibited by Figure 3.5.  
 
Figure 3.3 Completed Treatment Process 
 
As before, a proportion ( ( ))icw tα of these casualties who have completed one time period 
of treatment will RTD while remaining casualties will automatically be staged for 
evacuation as represented by the arc 3 ( )icwH t  flowing from 
( ) ( 1)i icw cwExit t EvacStage t→ + .  Per a METCOM default policy, these casualties that 
have completed one time period of treatment are not bounded by the evacuation capacity  
nor do they reduce the capacity for the 2 ( )icwH t  GenTre flow or 1 ( 1)
i
cwH t +  NonTre flow 
because the latter have higher priorities.  This is representative of the policy that once 
completed with a period of treatment the METS priority is to free up additional bed space 
at the MTF for treating inflow of new casualties.  Thus, once completed with treatment, 
casualties will be sent to the evacuation staging area where they can be prioritized for 
evacuation.   
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IV. DESCRIPTIVE MODEL APPLICATION 
 “Victory and defeat are each of the same price.” 
- Thomas Jefferson 
 
A. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOES): 
In general, much like the theater METS policy, MOEs are selected by the 
SECDEF and CJCS and complied with by the COCOM and Joint Theater Surgeon (JTS).  
They assist in determining the appropriate prioritization and policies for treatment and 
evacuation timelines for casualty care and significantly impact the structural requirement 
of the METS.  The primary MOEs associated with METCOM are developed around the 
ideal that optimal utilization of treatment and evacuation assets corresponds to minimal 
or no casualty queues.  This is founded upon the notion that a casualty placed in a 
medical or evacuation queue is not receiving continuity of care, thus increasing the 
likelihood that the medical condition will exacerbate.  Table 4.1 exhibits the MOEs 
chosen as metrics within the METCOM. 
CATEGORY EXPLANATION OF CATEGORY
1.  HQ Mean
2.  HQ Max
3.  T1Q Mean
4.  T1Q Max
5.  T2Q Mean
6.  T2Q Max
The maximum number of casualties for any one time period who while at the 
MTF receive General treatment and are then delayed in the treatment queue.
The average number of casualties delayed in the Evacuation Queue.
The maximum number of casualties for any one time period who are delayed in 
the Evacuation Queue.
The average number of casualties who while at the MTF receive no treatment 
and are delayed in the medical queue.
The maximum number of casualties for any one time period who while at the 
MTF receive no treatment and are delayed in the treatment queue.
The average number of casualties who while at the MTF receive General 
treatment and are then delayed in the medical queue.
 




Each of these MOEs are taken over the time horizon of ten time periods (S=10).  
The HQ flow is the individual EvaPri (w=4) casualty types summed over all the TriCats, 
while the T1Q and T2Q are the individual TriCat (c=4) categories summed over all the 
EvaPris.   
B.  CASUALTY DISTRIBUTIONS 
For comparison purposes, the implementation of METCOM also utilizes different 
casualty inflow distributions for each of the four policies discussed in the Chapter 3 
(Treatment Priority or Evacuation Priority Policies and their two sub-policies, General 
and Balanced).  Figure 4.1 exhibits the mean values at each time period of the four 
distributions utilized and are representative of different operational scenarios or 





















Figure 4.1 Casualty Inflow Distributions 
It is assumed that casualties are correlated with combat operational intensity, thus 
casualties will be lower when operational intensity is low and casualties increase as the 
operational intensity increases.  Historical analysis has exhibited this assumption holds 
valid due to increase in casualties caused by both battle injuries and non-battle injuries as 
operational tempo and intensity heightens (Leedham and Blood, 1992) 
As stated, the distributions are representative of casualty flows that might be 
observed during specific types of combat operations or simply during certain periods of 
individual operations.  Table 4.2 below exhibits the mean values utilized in all iterations 
of generating the casualty inflow values for each distribution.  Additionally, Table 4.3 
exhibits the actual maximum and minimum values observed for each time period over the 
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entire generation of values which is explained more in-depth below.  Additionally, how 
each specific distribution was drawn and some basic assumptions on what type combat 
operation the distribution might reflect best are identified below.   
In each distribution we have a chosen mean value for each time period.  The 
actual inflow in each period is drawn from a normal distribution with the designated 
mean and standard deviation identified in the Table 4.2.  Thus, the set of values for 
periods 1 thru 10 constitute one sample point in the analysis.  This was repeated to 
generate 1000 sample points for each distribution of which Figure 4.1 displays its mean 
values.  In all cases, the generated distribution values are held constant across all policy 
types, allowing for ease in cross comparisons.   
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Spike Mean 15 45 65 85 60 40 25 20 15 15
Increasing Mean 15 25 35 45 55 65 68 71 74 77
Uniform Mean 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Unimodal Mean 10 20 30 40 50 55 45 35 25 15
Standard Deviation: For All Distributions in Each Time Period σ = 5  
Table 4.2 Mean Values for Each Sample Distribution (n=1000) 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Unimodal Distribtution
Min 0 15 29 44 58 57 44 28 14 0
Max 32 44 62 76 99 88 79 60 45 31
Spike Distribtution
Min 0 29 51 69 44 25 10 3 1 0
Max 30 60 80 100 76 60 43 36 37 32
Increasing Distribtution
Min 0 11 21 32 41 49 48 55 59 61
Max 37 40 51 60 74 81 85 86 90 90
Uniform Distribtution
Min 33 32 32 34 35 36 32 35 30 34
Max 67 64 68 67 68 69 66 67 68 67  
Table 4.3 Observed Min and Max Values of Each Sample Distribution (n=1000) 
Unimodal: Combat operations that are low in intensity to begin with, 
gradually peak to a high point and then reside back towards initial levels. 
Spike:  Combat operations that peak in intensity very quickly, but then 
quickly reside to much lower levels. 
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Increasing: Combat operations that gradually intensify over the entire duration 
of the operational time window. 
Uniform: Combat operations that maintain a specific level of intensity for the 
entire duration. 
 
C. APPLICATION OF THE DESCRIPTIVE METCOM MODEL 
1. Assumed Parameters 
For each of the models tested, multiple parameters were chosen and statically set 
as exhibited in Tables 4.4 thru 4.5.  These parameters are user chosen and are subject to 
change by decision makers. However for the entirety of the METCOM descriptive model, 
all parameters were statically set as below. 
The TriCat:EvaPri Probability matrix below in Table 4.4 exhibits the probability 
that each inbound casualty is assigned a specific (c,w) class designating its specific triage 
and evacuation priority.  Again, as recent conflicts have exhibited, a majority of the 
traumas received by casualties are serious penetrating wounds and lacerations caused by 
shrapnel and gunfire (Gawande, 2004; Leedham and Blood, 1992).  Thus, we assume that 
slightly more casualties will be of serious nature as exhibited by the highlighted quadrant 
of Table 4.4. 
Evacuation Priority (w) 
 w1 w2 w3 w4 
c1 0.125 0.125 0 0 
c2 0.125 0.125 0.1 0.1 











c4 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 
Table 4.4 TriCat:EvaPri Probability Matrix 
Similarly the RTD probability matrix exhibited in Table 4.5 represents the 
assumed probability that a casualty is able to return to duty upon completion of medical 
treatment.  As before, it is assumed that the less severely injured of the casualties, as 
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exhibited in the shaded area of the table, have a much greater chance to RTD than 
casualties with more acute injuries. 
Evacuation Priority (w) 
 w1 w2 w3 w4 
c1 0.025 0.025 0.05 0.025 
c2 0.025 0.025 0.15 0.20 











c4 0 0.025 0.025 0.025 
Table 4.5  RTD Probability Matrix 
The Resource Utilization Requirements parameter (Pcw) as exhibited in Table 4.6 
indicates the amount of general evacuation capacity that a casualty of type (c,w) requires.  
It is representative of the fact that more severe casualties will require increased utilization 
of medical staff, additional patient movement items, and higher likelihood of requiring a 
litter or bed configuration versus a standard chair/seat within an evacuation asset.  Thus, 
the casualties with minimal injuries are assigned a requirement of one (1), indicating they 
require no additional capacity other than a basic seat.  However, the more severe 
casualties require additional capacity and thus are assigned a requirement of two (2) or 
three (3) resources per casualty upon the evacuation asset capacity. 
Evacuation Priority (w) 
 w1 w2 w3 w4 
c1 3 3 2 2 
c2 3 3 2 2 











c4 3 3 3 3 
Table 4.6 EvaCapG Resource Utilization Requirements (Pcw) 
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2. Assumed Capacities 
The treatment and evacuation capacities chosen for the implementation of 
METCOM where representative of typical Level II and Level III HSS setups that might 
be seen in numerous AOs.  Specifically, the LOCs and their evacuation assets where 
designated as exhibited in Table 4.7 below. 
 MEDICAL CAPABILITIES EVACUATION ASSETS 
 OR ICU WARD AMBULATORY LITTER 
LEVEL II 6 17 60 22 15 
LEVEL III 12 30 96 37 24 
Table 4.7 Medical and Evacuation Capacities 
The Level II medical capabilities are representative of any one of the following: 
•  2 Shock Trauma Platoons (STP) or 
•  1 Surgical Company of the Medical Battalion, Force Service Support 
 Group (FSSG) or 
•  1 Casualty Receiving and Treatment Ship (CRTS) of LHD/LHA type.   
The Level III medical capabilities are representative of an Expeditionary Medical 
Facility (EMF) which is typically a 1/4 to 1/3 subset of a full blown 500 bed Fleet 
Hospital.  This is in line with the concept of keeping the LOCs mobile and minimizing 
their footprint within the theater of operations. 
The evacuation assets are based upon the capacities of helicopters which are the 
preferred option for transporting casualties to CRTSs and MTFs ashore.  Helicopters 
provide for the most rapid and least traumatic means of MEDEVAC, however, they are 
conducted on a “lift of opportunity” basis and are not organic or dedicated to any specific 
MTF (NWP 3-02.1, 1993).  Therefore, it was assumed that on a best case scenario there 
would either be a single available helicopter or other equivalent asset available to 
evacuate casualties at any given time.  The LOC II capacities are based upon the CH-46 
helicopter capacity and the LOC III is based upon the CH-53 helicopter capacity. 
Additionally, the treatment and evacuation capacities are held constant for each 
time period, and LOC I evacuation capacities were made extraordinarily large so that all 
casualty flow would automatically make it to LOC II.  This allows for concentrated 
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analysis of LOC II and LOC III MTFs, which is where the predominant flexibility and 
necessitation for medical care and evacuation assets exist during forward combat 
operations.  Specifically for this scenario, the capacities were set at the capability levels 









TreCapG (General Treatment) 75 96 
TreCapS1 (Immediate) 6 12 
TreCapS2 (Urgent) 17 30 
TreCapS3 (Minimal) 75 96 
TreCapS4 (Expectant) 17 30 
Table 4.8 Treatment Capacities at LOCs  
General Treatment is based upon the size of medical staff and number of ward 
beds that each MTF has organic to it.  It is assumed that the MTF can always treat 
casualties of the Minimal category up to the full bed capacity.  The number of OR tables 
determines the number of Immediate type casualties that can be treated.  Similarly, the 
number of ICU beds determines the maximum number of Urgent and Expectant 








EvaCapG (General Evac) 22 37 
EvaCapS1 (Urgent) 15 24 
EvaCapS2 (Priority) 15 24 
EvaCapS3 (Routine) 22 37 
EvaCapS4 (Convenience) 22 37 
Table 4.9 Evacuation Capacities at LOCs  
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General Evacuation capacity is based upon the full number of seats configured on 
the helicopter that casualties who are ambulatory or able to sit in an upright position may 
fill.  The Routine and Convenience type casualties are assumed to require no special 
configuration and thus are only limited by the overall seat capacity of the general 
evacuation capacity.  However, the Urgent and Priority type casualties are assumed to 
require being in a supine position, thus their capacities are limited by the litter 
configuration of the helicopter. 
D. LOC II RESULTS 
Results for the MOEs at LOC II are presented below.  The objective is to utilize a 
specific casualty inflow distribution for generating 10-dimensional sample points and 
then to compare the various policy types across this generated sample space.  In that we 
evaluate which policy type appears to handle a particular distribution best as exhibited in 
the MOEs.  Tables 4.10 thru 4.21 display the mean, standard deviation, and the maximum 
mean value observed of the MOEs for each of the policies and their sub-policies (as 
explicitly described in Chapter 3) when tested over the generated 1000 sample points.  
Figures 4.2 thru 4.13 display the maximum MOE value observed for each policy 
throughout the full time horizon and over the entire sample space.   
To reiterate, each sample point generates a value for the mean and maximum 
queue size generated over the ten time periods.  The averages of these 1000 mean values 
exhibited are the MOE values that are displayed in the tables below.  The max values 
contained in the figures differ from the tables in that they are a single point maximum 
MOE value observed over all 10 time periods and over all 1000 sample points.  Together 
the tables and figures allow the decision maker to better discern the long run behavior 
and peak behavior of each queue.   
Lastly, to reiterate the tracking scheme, the HQ flow is tracked by the EvaPri (w) 
index while the T1Q and T2Q flows are tracked by TriCat (c) index. 
1. Increasing Distribution 
a. Evacuation Queue (HQ) 
Values for HQ are displayed in Table 4.10 and Figure 4.2.  In general, the 
queue worsens for each policy as EvaPri becomes less of a priority.  While there appears 
to be no standout policy, EPP-GPSP does appear to be slightly better than the rest overall 
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as it has the lowest mean value in three of the evacuation queue categories.  Of noticeable 
outliers is the spike exhibited in Figure 4.2 caused in the TPP-BPSP maximum values for 
the Convenience priority casualties.  However, this may be of marginal concern as these 
casualties realistically have minimal medical complications associated with them. 
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
Urgent
Mean 2.98 2.95 1.60 1.60
Standard Deviation 0.88 0.88 0.59 0.59
Maximum 5.90 5.90 4.00 4.00
Priority
Mean 10.79 10.74 13.20 13.20
Standard Deviation 1.64 1.62 1.50 1.50
Maximum 16.30 16.30 18.80 18.80
Routine
Mean 19.30 18.56 19.21 19.21
Standard Deviation 3.05 2.87 2.86 2.86
Maximum 30.80 29.40 30.80 30.80
Convenience
Mean 19.51 16.64 18.95 18.95
Standard Deviation 3.21 2.91 3.06 3.06
Maximum 31.70 26.80 31.20 31.20  



















Urgent Priority Routine Convenience
Evacuation Priority (w)
Level II Evacuation Queue (HQ)
with Increasing Distribution
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
 
Figure 4.2 Max Values of HQ at LOC II with Increasing Distribution 
 
b. General Treatment Queue (T1Q) 
Values for T1Q are displayed in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.3.  Again no 
policy appears to standout above the others.  However, a general trend is obvious that 
while all policies treat the Immediate TriCat casualties better than the other TriCats, there 
are comparatively and significantly large queues generated for the Urgent category of 
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TriCats.  As Table 4.11 exhibits, the Urgent category ranges from a best of mean value 
11.38 to a worst of 13.5 casualties. 
 
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
Immediate
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
Urgent
Mean 13.23 13.50 11.38 11.38
Standard Deviation 2.89 2.88 2.66 2.66
Maximum 23.00 23.40 21.00 21.00
Minimal
Mean 12.59 13.47 11.68 11.68
Standard Deviation 2.16 2.18 2.22 2.22
Maximum 20.30 20.80 18.70 18.70
Expectant
Mean 9.72 9.90 8.50 8.50
Standard Deviation 1.79 1.75 1.51 1.51
Maximum 13.20 13.80 12.00 12.00  














Immediate Urgent Minimal Expectant
Evacuation Priority (w)
Level II Evacuation Queue (T1Q)
with Increasing Distribution
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
 
Figure 4.3 Max Values of T1Q at LOC II with Increasing Distribution 
 
c. Specialty Treatment Queue (T2Q) 
The values for T2Q are displayed in Table 4.12 and Figure 4.4.  Overall, 
none of the policies performs as well in the two highest acuity TriCats as compared to the 
two lowest TriCats.  The most obvious specific concern is the spike in maximum 
casualties as observed in the TPP-BPSP Immediate TriCat and exhibited in Figure 4.4. 
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TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
Immediate
Mean 7.37 7.39 5.08 5.08
Standard Deviation 1.22 1.21 0.89 0.89
Maximum 11.30 11.30 8.00 8.00
Urgent
Mean 14.42 14.66 17.25 17.25
Standard Deviation 1.18 1.16 1.21 1.21
Maximum 18.80 19.20 21.60 21.60
Minimal
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00
Maximum 0.00 0.00 1.10 0.00
Expectant
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Maximum 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00  














Immediate Urgent Minimal Expectant
Evacuation Priority (w)
Level II Evacuation Queue (T2Q)
with Increasing Distribution
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
 
Figure 4.4 Max Values of T2Q at LOC II with Increasing Distribution 
 
2. Unimodal Distribution 
a. Evacuation Queue (HQ) 
The values for HQ are displayed in Table 4.13 and Figure 4.5.  Results for 
this distribution were similar to the previous distribution in that no policy was a standout 
best policy, but the EPP-GPSP was slightly lower for the majority of the mean queue 
sizes.  Again like the last distribution, the TPP-BPSP produces a spike in its maximum 
queue size for the Convenience EvaPri category. 
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TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
Urgent
Mean 3.43 3.43 6.43 1.61
Standard Deviation 1.19 1.19 1.55 0.66
Maximum 7.70 7.70 11.20 4.60
Priority
Mean 14.38 13.80 11.34 16.83
Standard Deviation 1.76 1.78 1.77 1.69
Maximum 18.80 18.30 15.50 21.70
Routine
Mean 19.76 18.30 19.47 19.84
Standard Deviation 2.79 2.37 2.91 2.47
Maximum 30.00 28.70 30.00 31.70
Convenience
Mean 16.13 13.31 15.73 16.17
Standard Deviation 2.64 3.03 2.90 2.75
Maximum 25.10 21.10 56.50 25.10  


















Urgent Priority Routine Convenience
Evacuation Priority (w)
Level II Evacuation Queue (HQ)
with Unimodal Distribution
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
 
Figure 4.5 Max Values of HQ at LOC II with Unimodal Distribution 
 
b. General Treatment Queue (T1Q) 
The values for T1Q are displayed in Table 4.14 and Figure 4.6.  This again 
is very similar to the Increasing distribution in that Immediate TriCat casualties are 
handled exceptionally well, but a jump in MOEs is seen in the Urgent TriCat casualties.  
Other than the Expectant category the two policies of EPP type appear to produce the 
best minimal queue sizes. 
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TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
Immediate
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.00
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.00
Maximum 0.00 0.00 5.28 0.00
Urgent
Mean 9.88 10.15 12.76 7.21
Standard Deviation 3.78 3.81 4.23 3.45
Maximum 24.80 24.80 28.90 20.60
Minimal
Mean 18.86 20.09 19.89 16.96
Standard Deviation 3.58 3.61 3.60 3.49
Maximum 26.70 27.30 26.70 26.90
Expectant
Mean 13.15 13.20 9.89 12.21
Standard Deviation 1.24 1.21 1.02 1.86
Maximum 19.60 19.60 15.00 15.40  















Immediate Urgent Minimal Expectant
Evacuation Priority (w)
Level II Evacuation Queue (T1Q)
with Unimodal Distribution
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
 
Figure 4.6 Max Values of T1Q at LOC II with Unimodal Distribution 
 
c. Specialty Treatment Queue (T2Q) 
The values for T2Q are displayed in Table 4.15 and Figure 4.7.  Again, 
none of the policies performs as well in the two highest TriCats as they do for the two 
less acute categories.  Additionally, no policy is a clear cut choice above the rest. 
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TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
Immediate
Mean 6.60 7.65 10.63 4.41
Standard Deviation 1.48 1.57 2.36 0.90
Maximum 12.20 13.00 27.70 8.40
Urgent
Mean 20.84 20.07 18.09 23.70
Standard Deviation 1.05 1.13 1.84 1.13
Maximum 24.00 23.20 22.10 26.30
Minimal
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.00
Maximum 0.00 0.00 4.15 0.00
Expectant
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00
Maximum 0.00 0.00 1.80 0.00  














Immediate Urgent Minimal Expectant
Evacuation Priority (w)
Level II Evacuation Queue (T2Q)
with Unimodal Distribution
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
 
Figure 4.7 Max Values of T2Q at LOC II with Unimodal Distribution 
 
3. Spike Distribution 
a. Evacuation Queue (HQ) 
The values for HQ are displayed in Table 4.16 and Figure 4.8.  All 
policies are very equivalent for this queue and distribution with the EPP-GPSP appearing 
marginally better than the rest in 3 of the 4 TriCats.  Of specific concern is that the TPP-
BPSP generates spiked maximum levels as exhibited in Figure 4.8 for both the Routine 
and Convenience categories. 
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TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
Urgent
Mean 2.80 2.81 1.28 1.28
Standard Deviation 0.84 0.85 0.46 0.46
Maximum 5.70 5.70 3.00 3.00
Priority
Mean 14.80 12.26 15.45 15.45
Standard Deviation 2.00 1.56 2.04 2.04
Maximum 19.90 17.90 21.50 21.50
Routine
Mean 25.83 24.32 27.82 27.82
Standard Deviation 2.17 2.95 2.40 2.40
Maximum 33.20 32.40 35.80 35.80
Convenience
Mean 16.58 16.44 16.54 16.54
Standard Deviation 2.97 2.56 3.28 3.28
Maximum 26.40 25.00 28.30 28.30  


















Urgent Priority Routine Convenience
Evacuation Priority (w)
Level II Evacuation Queue (HQ)
with Spike Distribution
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
 
Figure 4.8 Max Values of HQ at LOC II with Spike Distribution 
 
b. General Treatment Queue (T1Q) 
The values for T1Q are displayed in Table 4.17 and Figure 4.9.  Again the 
policies appear very equivalent with a slight advantage to the EPP-BPSP type in the 
Urgent and Minimal and Expectant categories. 
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TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
Immediate
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00
Maximum 0.00 0.00 1.41 0.00
Urgent
Mean 3.88 3.48 2.03 2.03
Standard Deviation 2.28 2.13 1.70 1.70
Maximum 13.90 11.70 10.40 10.40
Minimal
Mean 14.14 14.44 11.75 11.75
Standard Deviation 3.64 3.71 4.44 4.44
Maximum 27.00 27.30 26.40 26.40
Expectant
Mean 10.60 10.58 9.42 9.42
Standard Deviation 2.66 2.54 2.42 2.42
Maximum 21.20 20.00 16.40 16.40  















Immediate Urgent Minimal Expectant
Evacuation Priority (w)
Level II Evacuation Queue (T1Q)
with Spike Distribution
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
 
Figure 4.9 Max Values of T1Q at LOC II with Spike Distribution 
 
c. Specialty Treatment Queue (T2Q) 
The values for T2Q are displayed in Table 4.18 and Figure 4.10.  The 
general trend in this queue is that the all policies except for TPP-GPSP do fair in the 
Immediate category, but comparatively poor in the Urgent category, and then very good 
for the Minimal and Expectant categories.  Some concern should be concentrated on the 
exhibited high mean of 4.18 observed for the TPP-GPSP Immediate TriCat as this is 
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nearly three times as high as the next worst policy.  It might be representative that the 
policies are very sensitive to the casualty flow in this category and that in an influx of 
casualties during the spike phase causes large queues to occur that do not subside.  The 
TPP-GPSP policy apparently cannot overcome these queues as Figure 4.10 exhibits the 
overall maximum value within the TPP-GPSP Immediate category is almost identical to 
the overall queue mean of 22.00 exhibited in Table 4.18.  Thus, this suggests that the 
maximum queue size is carried out for nearly the entire duration of the time horizon. 
  
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
Immediate
Mean 1.01 2.08 1.90 1.90
Standard Deviation 0.96 1.28 1.11 1.11
Maximum 6.30 7.10 5.80 5.80
Urgent
Mean 24.43 21.72 25.48 25.48
Standard Deviation 6.05 3.99 4.92 4.92
Maximum 35.90 31.20 36.70 36.70
Minimal
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00
Maximum 0.00 0.00 1.93 0.00
Expectant
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Maximum 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00  














Immediate Urgent Minimal Expectant
Evacuation Priority (w)
Level II Evacuation Queue (T2Q)
with Spike Distribution
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
 
Figure 4.10 Max Values of T2Q at LOC II with Spike Distribution 
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4. Uniform Distribution 
a. Evacuation Queue (HQ) 
The values for HQ are displayed in Table 4.19 and Figure 4.11.  In general 
the policies are very equivalent, but it should be noted that each policy gets worse (queue 
sizes increase) as EvaPri lessens for the first three categories. 
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
Urgent
Mean 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.05
Standard Deviation 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.14
Maximum 1.70 1.60 1.50 1.50
Priority
Mean 21.51 16.74 20.71 20.71
Standard Deviation 3.24 2.62 3.35 3.35
Maximum 29.30 25.90 31.30 31.30
Routine
Mean 41.41 42.75 44.85 44.85
Standard Deviation 2.92 3.76 2.82 2.82
Maximum 46.10 49.80 49.70 49.70
Convenience
Mean 25.42 27.83 24.76 24.76
Standard Deviation 5.51 3.52 3.62 3.62
Maximum 40.50 39.20 37.70 37.70  

















Urgent Priority Routine Convenience
Evacuation Priority (w)
Level II Evacuation Queue (HQ)
with Uniform Distribution
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
 
Figure 4.11 Max Values of HQ at LOC II with Uniform Distribution 
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b. General Treatment Queue (T1Q) 
The values for T1Q are displayed in Table 4.20 and Figure 4.12.  Similar 
to the evacuation queue, each policy worsens during the first three EvaPris.  It appears 
that the EPP-GPSP is marginally the best policy while the TPP-GPSP type appears to be 
the worst. 
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
Immediate
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00
Maximum 0.00 0.00 1.41 0.00
Urgent
Mean 3.88 3.48 2.03 2.03
Standard Deviation 2.28 2.13 1.70 1.70
Maximum 13.90 11.70 10.40 10.40
Minimal
Mean 14.14 14.44 11.75 11.75
Standard Deviation 3.64 3.71 4.44 4.44
Maximum 27.00 27.30 26.40 26.40
Expectant
Mean 10.60 10.58 9.42 9.42
Standard Deviation 2.66 2.54 2.42 2.42
Maximum 21.20 20.00 16.40 16.40  















Immediate Urgent Minimal Expectant
Evacuation Priority (w)
Level II Evacuation Queue (T1Q)
with Uniform Distribution
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
 
Figure 4.12 Max Values of T1Q at LOC II with Uniform Distribution 
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c. Specialty Treatment Queue (T2Q) 
The values for T2Q are displayed in Table 4.21 and Figure 4.13.  Similar 
to the other distributions, every policy shows a large spike in queue size for the Urgent 
category comparative to the other TriCats.  In general, no policy is a clear standout above 
the others for this queue and distribution. 
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
Immediate
Mean 1.01 2.08 1.90 1.90
Standard Deviation 0.96 1.28 1.11 1.11
Maximum 6.30 7.10 5.80 5.80
Urgent
Mean 24.43 21.72 25.48 25.48
Standard Deviation 6.05 3.99 4.92 4.92
Maximum 35.90 31.20 36.70 36.70
Minimal
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Expectant
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  














Immediate Urgent Minimal Expectant
Evacuation Priority (w)
Level II Evacuation Queue (T2Q)
with Uniform Distribution
TPP-GPSP EPP-GPSP TPP-BPSP EPP-BPSP
 




5. LOC II General Conclusions 
While no policy appeared as a clear cut choice for any of the distributions, the two 
that stood out as marginally better at the more acute categories (c = 1,2 or w = 1,2) were 
the EPP-BPSP and EPP-GPSP.  The worst overall policy appeared to be the TPP-BPSP 
type as it produced multiple significant spikes within the HQ for the Convenience 
category and less often but still large spikes for the Routine category.  Large spikes are 
not desired, and thus the TPP-BPSP plan is not recommended for use in some 
distributions. 
What was also discernable was that there consistently appeared to be a general 
trend that all policies could handle the Immediate/Urgent (TriCat/EvaPri)  casualty 
capacities better than they could the Urgent/Priority (TriCat/EvaPri) casualty capacities.  
As the ICU beds are the main linkage to the available medical capacities to the Urgent 
category casualties, it may be prudent to consider an increase in this specific medical 
capability if reduction in T1Q and T2Q sizes is warranted. 
This pattern also suggests that the current evacuation capacities are in general 
capable of evacuating the Urgent EvaPris within acceptable levels but at the cost of 
utilizing a large majority of the evacuation capacity available.  Therefore the lower 
priority EvaPris have such reduced capacity to compete for evacuation, that it reflects in 
much higher HQ means for EvaPris such as the Priority category. 
E. LOC III RESULTS 
While LOC II results were quite enlightening the LOC III findings were that the 
current treatment and evacuation capacities were quite sufficient to cause no queues to be 
formed.  However, several key takeaways can be noted from these type results.  First it 
would be beneficial to model the distributions again with higher mean values to see how 
LOC III capabilities do function when throughput of casualties to them is constraining to 
either medical and/or evacuation capacities.  Then, similar results and analysis could be 
determined on the effectiveness of policies with the LOC III much as they were in the 
LOC II MTFs. 
Additionally, this lends well to the optimization analysis done in the following 
chapter.  With no queues produced, it suggests that the LOC III capacities are 
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underutilized and there may be extensive waste of resources.  Thus, it is valuable to 
discern how much capacities can be reduced at LOC III and still functionally meet the 
objective of producing minimal or no queue sizes.  This will relate the range of sensitivity 
the system has to volume of casualties and the medical and evacuation capacities.  It will 
also assist in identifying resources that are not necessary at the MTF thereby allowing for 
reallocation of them to another asset or purely cutting them out to save costs. 
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V. METCOM OPTIMIZATION CAPABILITY 
“The very first requirement in a hospital 
is that it should do the sick no harm.” 
- Florence Nightingale 
 
 
A. CAPABILITIES OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
Dependent upon the cost and operational constraints emplaced upon the METS, 
decision makers can utilize results from the descriptive model to supplement both micro 
or macro adjustments to METS policy or capacities in order to better meet the identified 
MOEs.  However, METCOM offers also the ability for optimizing the METS structure 
subject to medical responsiveness and cost requirements.  METCOM is easily adjusted to 
addresses the following optimization problems: 
1)  Minimize the cost of medical capabilities subject to satisfying certain MOE 
and capacity constraints. 
2)  Minimize an MOE (e.g., queue size) subject to capacity and budget 
constraints. 
These additional modeling initiatives will be discussed and applied to scenarios in 
the next section.  However, the basic formulation of the optimization model is as follows: 
Optimization Model 
Indices 
t - Time period     where t = 1…T 
i - Medical level of care (LOC)   where i = 1,…,5 
c – Triage category of casualty (TriCat)  where c = 1,…,4 
w – Evacuation priority category (EvaPri)  where w = 1,…,4 
c,w – Designated class of a casualty inclusive of their unique TriCat and EvaPri 
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Parameters 
S  Number of time periods of the operation (Time Horizon). 
( )cwd t   Number of new combat casualties of class (c,w) at time period t. 
( )iwUHQ t  Upper bound on evacuation queue size of casualties in EvaPri w at 
LOC i and at time period t (Decision maker requirement). 
1 ( )iUT Q t  Upper bound on general treatment queue size of casualties in 
EvaPri w at LOC i and at time period t (Decision maker 
requirement). 
2 ( )icUT Q t  Upper bound on specialty treatment queue size of casualties in 
EvaPri w at LOC i and at time period t (Decision maker 
requirement). 
( )iTMAX t  Maximum possible general capacity at LOC i at time period t. 
( )icTMAX t  Maximum possible specialty capacity for casualty type c at LOC i 
at time period t. 
( )iEMAX t  Maximum evacuation capacity allowable at LOC i and at time 
period t. 
( )iwEMAX t  Maximum evacuation capacity allowable for priority type w at 
LOC i and at time period t. 
cCT  Cost of delivering one unit of specialty medical treatment capacity for 
casualty type c. 
GCT  Cost of delivering one unit of general medical treatment capacity for any 
type casualty. 
wCE  Cost of delivering one unit of specialty evacuation capacity for casualty of 
priority w. 
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GCE  Cost of delivering one unit of general evacuation capacity for casualty of 
priority w. 
cwP  The general evacuation capacity resources required by a single casualty of 
class (c,w). 
( )icw tα  Proportion of class (c,w) casualties at level of care i that receive completed 
treatment and are returned to duty in time period t. 
Decision Variables 
( )iTreCapG t  General treatment capacity at level of care i in period t. 
( )icTreCapS t  Specialty treatment capacity of Type c casualty at level of care i in 
time period t. 
( )iEvaCapG t  General evacuation capacity at level of care i in period t. 
( )iwEvaCapS t  Evacuation capacity of Type w priority at level of care i in time 
period t. 
Computational Variables: 
1 ( )icwT t  Number of casualties in class (c,w) at LOC i receiving General 
Treatment (GenTre) in bed at the MTF during time period t. 
2 ( )icwT t  Number of casualties in class (c,w) at LOC i receiving Specialty 
Treatment of type c (SpecTrec) in bed at the MTF during time 
period t. 
1 ( )icwT Q t  Number of casualties of in class (c,w) at LOC i having received 
Non-Treatment (NonTre) and delayed in queue during time period 
t.  This queue is labeled NonTre queue. 
2 ( )icwT Q t  Number of casualties in class (c,w) at LOC i having received 
GenTre in bed and then delayed in queue prior to SpecTre during 
time period t.  This queue is labeled GenTre queue. 
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1 ( )icwH t  Number of casualties in class (c,w) at LOC i having received no 
treatment (NonTre) at this level and sent to evacuation staging in 
time period t. 
2 ( )icwH t  Number of casualties in class (c,w) at LOC i having received 
GenTre in bed and sent to evacuation staging in time period t+1 
before receiving SpecTrec. 
3 ( )icwH t  Number of casualties in class (c,w) at LOC i having received 
complete treatment (CompTre) during time period t and are sent to 
evacuation staging in time period t+1. 
( )icwHQ t  Number of casualties in class (c,w) at LOC i during period t being 
delayed in an evacuation queue. 
( )icwE t  Number of casualties in class (c,w) at LOC i  being evacuated to 
level of care i + 1 during time period t. 
( )icwRTD t  Number of casualties in class (c,w) at LOC i who are Returned to 
Duty during time period t. 
 
Following is the formulation for Problem Statement 1: Minimize the cost of 





Min   i i i ic c G w w G
c w
CT TreCapS CT TreCapG CE EvaCapS CE EvaCapG⎡ ⎤+ + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑  (5.1) 
It is assumed that the available capacities for both treatment and evacuation hold 





The balance of flow at an Input node is: 
*( 1) 1 ( 1) 2 ( 1) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( 1) 0i i i i icw cw cw cw cw cwE t T Q t T Q t H t T Q t T Q t− + − + − − − − − =  (5.2) 
The balance of flow at an Intermed node is: 
1 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 0i i i icw cw cw cwT t H t T Q t T t− − − =  (5.3) 
The balance of flow at an Exit node is: 
2 ( ) 3 ( ) ( ) 0i i icw cw cwT t H t RTD t
∗∗
− − =   (5.4) 
The balance of flow at an Evac Stage node is: 
1 ( ) 2 ( 1) 3 ( 1) ( 1) ( ) ( ) 0i i i i i icw cw cw cw cw cwH t H t H t HQ t HQ t E t+ − + − + − − − =  (5.5) 
* At LOC I, this term is replaced by the inflow of new combat casualties, ( )cwd t  





The total number of casualties who may receive GenTre must be less than the 
general treatment capacity of LOC i at time period t. 
1 ( ) ( ) 0     i icw
c w
T t TreCapG t i− ≤ ∀∑∑   (5.6) 
The numbers of casualties in TriCat who may receive SpecTre must be less than 
the specialty treatment capacity of LOC i at time period t. 
2 ( ) ( ) 0     i icw c
w
T t TreCapS t i− ≤ ∀∑   (5.7) 
The total number of casualties  who may be evacuated must require equal or less 
evacuation resources than allowed within the general evacuation capacity of LOC i at 
time period t. 
( ) ( ) 0     i icw cw
c w
P E t EvaCapG t i− ≤ ∀∑∑   (5.8) 
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The number of casualties in EvaPri who may be evacuated must be less than the 
specialty evacuation capacity of LOC i at time period t. 
( ) ( ) 0     i icw w
c
E t EvaCapS t i− ≤ ∀∑   (5.9) 
The resources required for the combined specialty evacuation capacities must be 
equal or less than the general evacuation capacity in LOC i at time period t. 
0     i icw w
w
P EvaCapS EvaCapG i− ≤ ∀∑    (5.10) 
 
Constraints 5.11 and 5.12 coincide with the joint doctrine that states, “Each 
succeeding level [LOC] possesses the same treatment capabilities as those forward of it 
(NTTP 4-02.2, 2001).”  This same doctrine is assumed to hold as well for evacuation 
capabilities as represented in constraints 5.13 and 5.14.  Additionally, the capacities must 
be bound as exhibited in constraints 5.15 thru 5.18 by some upper limit representing the 
realization that expansion of capabilities is not limitless and is constrained by available 
resources. 
The specialty treatment capacity at higher LOCs must be equal or greater than 
that same specialty treatment capacity at a lower LOC at time period t. 
1 0     i ic cTreCapS TreCapS i
+
− ≤ ∀     (5.11) 
The general treatment capacity at higher LOCs must be equal or greater than the 
general treatment capacity at a lower LOC at time period t. 
1 0     i iTreCapG TreCapG i+− ≤ ∀    (5.12) 
The specialty evacuation capacity at higher LOCs must be equal or greater than 
that same specialty evacuation treatment capacity at a lower LOC at time period t. 
1 0     i iw wEvaCapS EvaCapS i
+
− ≤ ∀    (5.13) 
The general evacuation capacity at higher LOCs must be equal or greater than the 
general evacuation capacity at a lower LOC at time period t. 
1 0     i iEvaCapG EvaCapG i+− ≤ ∀    (5.14) 
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The general treatment capacity at LOC i must be lower than some upper bound at 
time period t. 
( ) ( )     i iTreCapG t TMAX t i≤ ∀   (5.15) 
The specialty treatment capacity at LOC i must be lower than some upper bound 
at time period t. 
( ) ( )     i ic cTreCapS t TMAX t i≤ ∀   (5.16) 
The general evacuation capacity at LOC i must be lower than some upper bound 
at time period t. 
( ) ( )     i iEvaCapG t EMAX t i≤ ∀   (5.17) 
The specialty evacuation capacity at LOC i must be lower than some upper bound 
at time period t. 
( )     i iw wEvaCapS EMAX t i≤ ∀   (5.18) 
Constraints 5.19 thru 5.21 represent the decision makers’ selection of acceptable 
risk and inefficiency of the METS within the METCOM.  These constraints indicate the 
maximum queue size acceptable in the treatment and evacuation processes.  Again, as 
queues represent a discontinuity of care, allowing higher upper bounds constitutes an 
accepted increase risk in the morbidity and mortality rates of casualties being treated in 
the HSS system. 
The allowable evacuation queue size at LOC i must be lower than some upper 
bound at time period t. 
( ) ( )     i icw w
c
HQ t UHQ t i≤ ∀∑    (5.19) 
The allowable general treatment queue size at LOC i must be lower than some 
upper bound at time period t. 
,
1 ( ) 1 ( )    i icw
c w
T Q t UT Q t i≤ ∀∑   (5.20) 
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The allowable specialty treatment queue size at LOC i must be lower than some 
upper bound at time period t. 
2 ( ) 2      i icw c
w
T Q t UT Q i≤ ∀∑   (5.21) 
, , , inti i i ic wTreCapG TreCapS EvaCapG EvaCapS =  (5.22) 
, , , 0     i i i ic wTreCapG TreCapS EvaCapG EvaCapS i≥ ∀  (5.23) 
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
Similar to the descriptive model, we must make several assumptions about the 
associated variables and parameters.  Both are purely user chosen and may be set at any 
range of different values to reflect decision makers desires for more lax or more stringent 
requirements.  Table 5.1 exhibits the selected costs (CTc, CTG, CEw, CEG) associated 
with delivery medical general and specialty treatment.  A baseline cost is assigned to the 
general treatment capacity and then the cost for specialty treatment is derived from this.  
Here, we assume that casualties of type Immediate cost twice as much per casualty 
treated as the general treatment did.  The remaining specialty capacity costs are assigned 
according to the expected resource utilization levels they demand above the general 
treatment capacity. 
CAPACITY TYPE LEVEL II COSTS LEVEL III COSTS 
TreCapG (General Treatment) 2 2 
TreCapS1 (Immediate) 4 4 
TreCapS2 (Urgent) 3 3 
TreCapS3 (Minimal) 2 2 
TreCapS4 (Expectant) 3 3 
Table 5.1 Treatment Costs of Providing One Unit of Capacity 
Table 5.2 exhibits the selected costs (CEw, CEG) associated with evacuating 
capacities.  In this scenario we assume that evacuation capacity costs are uniformly twice 
as much as the associated treatment capacities.  Thus, all figures are doubled from the 




CAPACITY TYPE LEVEL II COSTS LEVEL III COSTS 
EvaCapG (General Evac) 4 4 
EvaCapS1 (Urgent) 8 8 
EvaCapS2 (Priority) 6 6 
EvaCapS3 (Routine) 4 4 
EvaCapS4 (Convenience) 6 6 
Table 5.2 Evacuation Costs of Providing One Unit of Capacity 
The constraints on the maximum allowable evacuation and treatment queue sizes 
(UHQ, UT1Q, and UT2Q) were set as exhibited in Table 5.3 below.  For this scenario, it 
was assumed that queues were not acceptable for the most acute casualties (c=1,2 or 
w=1,2) and thus the maximum queue size of each were set to zero. 






HQ Urgent 0 0 
HQ Priority 0 0 
HQ Routine 11 18 
HQ Convenience 11 18 
T1Q Immediate 0 0 
T1Q Urgent 0 0 
T1Q Minimal 8 10 
T1Q Expectant 5 9 
T21Q Immediate 0 0 
T2Q Urgent 0 0 
T2Q Minimal 8 10 
T2Q Expectant 5 9 




The non-zero values for maximum queue sizes exhibited in Table 5.3 were set as 
follows for i = 2 and 3 (LOC II and LOC III); 
  ( 3, 4) :iwUHQ w =  At 50% of the ambulatory evacuation capacity set at LOC 
II and III respectively. 
1  & 2   (c=3):i ic cUT Q UT Q  At 10% of the treatment capacity for Minimal TriCats set at 
LOC II and III respectively. 
1  & 2   (c=4):i ic cUT Q UT Q  At 30% of the treatment capacity for Expectant TriCats set 
at LOC II and III respectively. 
Again, these can be set at any range of values to reflect the planners’ and decision 
makers’ objectives. 
C. CASUALTY INFLOW 
With the preceding assumptions made, METCOM was tested with the TPP-GPSP 
policy utilized in the descriptive model.  For equivalency in comparison the same 
Uniform distribution with 50µ =  was utilized as the base for inflow of casualties.  Due 
to modeling limitations, σ  was set at 0, thereby causing exactly 50 casualties to enter the 
system each time period.  
D. RESULTS 
Table 5.4 below exhibits the treatment capacities of the default METS and then 
after the optimization model has been applied.   
Most notable is that there appears plentiful capacities in most cases, allowing for 
quite significant reductions in actual required capacity to meet all constraints.  The most 
heavily laden capacities to meet casualty demand appear in LOC II for the Urgent and 
Minimal casualty types, with capacity actually requiring increasing for the former of the 
two.  This is indicative of what is somewhat expected as the more acute TriCats require 
greater utilization of ORs and ICU beds which are costly and difficult for the current 
LOC II MTFs to maintain given their goal maximum mobility and minimum footprint in 















TreCapG (General Treatment) 75 25 96 31 
TreCapS1 (Immediate) 6 9 12 7 
TreCapS2 (Urgent) 17 17 30 16 
TreCapS3 (Minimal) 75 0 96 5 
TreCapS4 (Expectant) 17 2 30 0 
Table 5.4 Default and Optimized Treatment Capacities for TPP-GPSP Policy 
Table 5.5 below exhibits the evacuation capacities of the default METS and then 
after the optimization model has been applied.  Similar to the treatment capacities, the 
most acute evacuation categories of Urgent and Priority require at least if not more 
capacity than what is currently offered at LOC II.  The model also exhibits that while 
LOC III capacities appear more than adequate, the LOC II evacuation assets are almost at 














EvaCapG (General Evac) 22 19 37 3 
EvaCapS1 (Urgent) 15 16 24 12 
EvaCapS2 (Priority) 15 15 24 9 
EvaCapS3 (Routine) 22 5 37 0 
EvaCapS4 (Convenience) 22 8 37 0 
Table 5.5 Default and Optimized Evacuation Capacities for TPP-GPSP Policy 
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The actual optimization of cost in this scenario is exhibited in Table 5.6 and 
represents a 34% cost reduction. 
 OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE 
Default Capacity 1240 
Optimized Capacity 815 
Table 5.6 Objective Function Values 
 
E. DISCUSSION 
The optimization model highlights many key factors, probably the most important 
of which may be that we have significant over-allocation of resources in some treatment 
and evacuation capacities.  Caution must be advised here though, as this is specific to the 
chosen distribution, assumptions, and time horizon chosen for the model.  However, it 
does give us particularly good insight upon how well the current assets and policy would 
function and potentially more important, what cost is required to meet the needs. 
By identifying the capacity requirements, METCOM also presents further insight 
into how unmet capacities can be addressed.  For example, we indicated that Immediate 
and Urgent capacities in LOC II were fully utilized or unmet by the default MTF 
capabilities.  By knowing how much need is unmet, decision makers can make a sound 
decision on how to resolve the issue.  For small unmet needs, planners may wish to 
simply or increase the assets at the MTF to accommodate the requirement.  This might 
not be the case if large unmet needs materialize as increasing the size of the MTF too 
much conflicts with the objective of forward deployed MTFs maintaining mobility and a 
small footprint in theater.  Thus, the need might warrant employing an additional LOC II 
MTF within the AO in order to supplement the needed capacities, but still maintain the 
advantages of individually small and mobile units. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
“Pay every attention to the sick and wounded.  Sacrifice your baggage, 
everything for them.  Let the wagons be devoted to their use, and if 
necessary your own saddles.” 
-Napoleon I4 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Probably one of the most challenging aspects to the METS is the dynamic 
environment in which it must operate and the shear magnitude of unknowns caused by 
the “Fog of War”.  The number of variables effecting both treatment and evacuation can 
at times be staggering.  As Kott (1999) states, “New patient requests come in; others get 
canceled…availability of key assets is subject to unpredictable events…and even weather 
can require a mission be delayed, rerouted, or canceled.”  Thus, it is paramount to have 
powerful yet realistic modeling techniques and tools to account for such variability and 
complexities within the medical and evacuation system.  METCOM accomplishes this by 
adding clarity of analysis through defined MOEs that aide decision makers in assessing 
the ramifications of policy and structural makeup of the HSS delivery system.  
Additionally, METCOM can address the cost associated with delivery of care and 
evacuation, allowing again for decision makers to meet all requirements at the minimal 
cost.  Taken together, the descriptive and optimization data that METCOM provides can 
be utilized by planners and decision makers to employ appropriate policies, insert 
necessary medical and evacuation capabilities within, and economize the cost so that 
unneeded resources may allocated elsewhere. 
Utilization of METCOM is most warranted in conjunction with other planning 
and analysis tools such as TML+ and MAT.  Together, they can provide the type of 
definitive qualitative and quantitative data that can clarify, validate, and support decision 
makers’ choices for policy implementation and capacity capabilities that best meet the 
objective of saving lives and mitigating injury and morbidity of the warfighters. 
 
                                                 
4 As cited in Chandler, David G. The Military Maxims of Napoleon New York; Macmillan; 1997. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
While illuminating in many ways, this is but a glimpse of the construct and 
processes of the military HSS system and METS capabilities.  While the purpose of the 
research was to provide a balance of descriptive and prescriptive analysis, it is by no 
means encompasses the entirety of complexities and variability within the METS.  
Numerous opportunities to expand and modify METCOM exist and include some of the 
following: 
METCOM did not limit nor consider the time in system of casualties when 
prioritizing their medical treatment or evacuation.  Thus, technically a casualty could 
remain stuck in a queue for multiple periods due to their inability to be prioritized over 
other casualties of greater TriCat or EvaPri competing for the same capacities.  It would 
be beneficial to incorporate a tracking index that would associate an increasing cost 
parameter for the greater amount of time a specific casualty remains in the system. 
It is also recommended that follow-on studies increase the breadth of the research 
by incorporating patient condition (PC) codes that expand the limited class (c,w) 
casualties into more specific acuity and anatomical region of injury.  Currently, well over 
400 PCs exist, but when categorized into anatomical region, can be aggregated into a few 
dozen groupings.  This would potentially lend to better prioritization of the absolute most 
acute casualties and also assist in identifying at a more precise level any gaps or delays 
that existed in accommodating special patient treatment or evacuation demands. 
Similarly, METCOM does not differentiate between causation of injury for any of 
the casualties.  Modeling whether injuries are due to being wounded in action (WIA), 
disease (DIS), or non-battle injury (NBI), could enhance the identification of required 
capacities and assist in building a prioritization policy necessary to address the situation.  
For example, resources required to treat multiple diseased patients could vary drastically 
from much of the blunt trauma expected with NBI or the acute lacerations and shrapnel 
wounds expected in WIA casualties. 
METCOM could also be modified with additional stressors to the efficient 
operation of the system by making the capacities dynamic rather than static during the 
time horizon of the model.  Particularly as evacuation capacity is dependent upon mostly 
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lifts of opportunity and operational availability of air and ground evacuation assets, 
modeling a capacity with moderate variability would again add realism to the scenario.  
A final stressor of the METS that could be added is the addition of enemy prisoners of 
war (EPWs), and non-combatant casualties to the population that requires treatment 
and/or evacuation.  Not only would this add overall casualty volume to the system, it 
could represent significant resource utilization.  EPWs require additional escort 
personnel, thereby potentially reducing available medical staff and always reducing 
evacuation capacity to accommodate the physical presence of Military Police (MP) or 
non-medical Retained Personnel (RP).  Noncombatants can cause other concerns, 
particularly when pediatric patients begin to fill the system.  Not only can they be 
overwhelming to the limited pediatric specialists in a theater of operations, but they may 
raise additional ethical, moral, and emotional considerations when deciding prioritization 
of (c,w) class as compared to an adult service member or even EPW of the same (c,w) 
class. 
Thus, it is obvious that the research contained herein is but a scratch of the surface 
on the topic of modeling and optimizing the METS.  This topic will continue to be at the 
forefront of Naval operational concerns, particularly with the evolving changes in LOC II 
structures and capabilities along with the future vision of performing all LOC III care 
from a seabasing asset (Medial Seabasing, 2005).  Therefore, the requirements for quality 
planning aides and tools such as TML+, MAT, and METCOM will continue to be of 
greatest necessity to assist decision makers in formulating optimal choices within the 




























TRIAGE CASUALTY CATEGORIES 
Group Type Description 
C1 Immediate 
Treatment 
The immediate treatment group includes patients requiring 
emergency life-saving surgery. These procedures should not be time 
consuming and should concern only those patients with high chances 
for survival such as respiratory obstruction, accessible hemorrhage, 
and emergency amputation. 
C2 Delayed 
Treatment 
The delayed treatment group includes patients badly in need of time-
consuming major surgery, but whose general condition permits 
delay in surgical treatment without unduly endangering life. To 
mitigate the often critical effects of delay in surgery, sustaining 
treatment, such as stabilizing IV fluids, splinting, administering 
antibiotics, performing catheterization and gastric decompression, 
and relieving pain, will be required. Examples are large muscle 
wounds, fractures of major bones, intra-abdominal and/or thoracic, 
head or spinal injuries, and uncomplicated major burns. 
C3 Minimal 
Treatment 
The minimal treatment group includes patients with relatively minor 
injuries who can effectively care for themselves or receive care from 
untrained personnel. Examples include minor lacerations, abrasions, 
fractures of small bones and minor burns. 
C4 Expectant The expectant treatment group comprises patients having serious 
and often multiple injuries, requiring time consuming and 
complicated treatment with a low chance of survival. If fully treated, 
these patients may make heavy demands on medical manpower and 
supplies.  Until the mass casualty situation is under control, they will 
receive appropriate supportive treatment.  The extent of treatment 
depends on available supplies and manpower and may involve the 
use of large doses of analgesics. These patients should not be 
abandoned and every effort made for their comfort. The possibility 
of their survival, despite alarming injuries, must always be 
considered. Examples include severe multiple injuries, severe head 
or spinal injuries, large doses of radiation, and widespread severe 
burns. 
C5 Deceased This group is comprised of the killed in action (KIA) and died of 
wounds received in action (DWRIA). They are the last category of 
patients and will be handled by Graves Registration, if established. 
However, in the absence of established graves registration, TF 
supply personnel will be responsible for the Mortuary Affairs 
Program. Master at Arms and Chaplains will assist in the initial 
phase of handling this category of patients.   





























Multicommodity Computational Arc Flow for Descriptive METS: 
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